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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a contribution to the research literature of the Vietnamese rural credit market 
during 1990s. The data used is from the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys carried out in 
1992/93 and 1997/98, providing both cross-sectional and panel data. 
The thesis consists of four main chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the rural credit 
markets. We find a big expansion of the formal credit sector over years but financial system 
remains largely underdeveloped with a dual structure in which formal and informal sectors 
exist side by side. Chapter 3 is a study assessing determinant factors of household's credit 
participation formal and informal credit markets. We contribute to the literature as the first 
research attempts to estimate the credit demand and the credit supply functions separately. 
We are also the pioneer in applying the bivariate probit model with partial observability in 
empirical study using data from Vietnam, The empirical analysis in the Chapter 4 
highlights the determinant factors of credit amount obtained. We find that poor rural 
households who seem to borrow most often are not those who borrow the largest loan size. 
The last chapter aims to assess the impact of formal credit on household consumption. To 
address problem of selection bias, we employ instrumental variable method. We show that 
on average each percent increased in household's formal credit per capita would lead to 
0.26 percent increased in consumption per capita. 
Our results draw some important policy implications. First, even though formal credit 
network continues to expand greatly to cover most rural areas, there is a question on the 
outreach and flexibility of credit services because rationing remains as a serious problem 
for rural households. Credit institutions should develop a better screening system, e. g. 
credit scoring system, to reduce collateral requirement which actually considered as one of 
the most obstacles of the formal credit access. Land regulations and fixed asset legal 
entitlement should also be reviewed together with improvement of administration 
procedure to enable households to use their property as collateral if required. In addition, 
increased demand for credit implies more investment opportunities. Hence, government 
should continue to improve the economic infrastructure to facilitate agricultural product 
trade market, provide better health and education system to maintain this demand. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The classical models of financial markets predict that capital should flow from busi- 
nesses offering low returns to those offering high returns. The principle of diminish- 
ing marginal returns to capital states that enterprises with little capital should be 
able to earn higher returns on their investment than enterprises with more capital, 
for a given level of investment opportunity. In other words, poorer firms should be 
able to pay banks higher interest rates than richer firms. As a consequence, credit 
providers should target poorer areas to lend as they will be able to lend at a higher 
price. A study by Lucas (1990) found that borrowers in India should be willing to 
pay nearly sixty times as much for capital as borrowers in the United States. If 
investors follow what the theory predicts then capital should flow from the US to 
India. By the same logic, funds should not only move from rich to poor countries 
but also from richer areas to poorer areas within any given country. However, the 
reality is more complicated and sits at odds with the basic theory states. Funds and 
capital tend to stay in wealthier markets leaving poor markets on the periphery. 
The rural credit markets in developing countries are interesting examples of these 
market failures where poor areas receive very little interest from credit organisations. 
It is common that segments of borrowers have different levels of access to certain 
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types of loans and certain types of credit institutions (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990). Credit 
rationing theory states that the interest rates may not be equilibrium determined 
by credit supply and demand. And some would-be borrowers may find themselves 
excluded or dissuaded from the formal sector such that lending may be not available 
to them at any price. Possible reasons for these constraints have been mentioned 
in a vast number of studies emphasizing the limited availability of formal funding, 
the riskiness and uncertainty of rural credit market, the problem of asymmetric 
information between lenders and rural borrowers, the weak enforcement system in 
less developed countries, and the poorly developed economic infrastructure (see, 
for example, Hoff & Stiglitz (1993), Aghion & Morduch (2005), Baxdhan (1999), 
Bell (1990), Ray (1998), Townsend (1995), among many others). Formal credit 
applicants may then adjust by turning to substitute but possibly more expensive 
financing sources, or may modify their first best allocation plans in other ways. 
In contrast to the formal sector, the informal sector provides much easier condi- 
tions of access to loans. Borrowers and lenders often live in the same areas, reducing 
information asymmetry. Lenders usually do not require any collateral or documents, 
the relationship is governed by informal habits. The incentive to borrowers to re- 
pay is based on a relationship of trust, although sometimes repayment is enforced 
through violence (Siamwalla, et al, 1990). The different levels of access to loans 
explains the fact that credit markets are often characterised by monopoly power of 
village moneylenders who charge borrowers a very high interest rate, such as 80 per- 
cent per year in the case of rural Pakistan (Aleem, 1990), or from 20 to 120 percent 
per year in different rural areas in India (Timberg, 1984). By charging high interest 
rates and providing short term loans, informal lenders sometimes force borrowers 
into a state of default. 
In 1960s, realising the failure of formal markets to provide financial services in 
poor rural areas, governments in low-income countries started intervening in the 
markets. Large government agricultural banks were given the responsibility for allo- 
cating funds. The interest rates were kept low, and banks would receive compensa- 
tion for their loss, with the hope that providing subsidized credit would encourage 
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improvements in farm production and reduction of poverty. Philippines and In- 
dia are two of the most cited examples for governments' cheap credit programmes 
(Meyer, 2002). However, the subsidized credit failed. The critics of the subsidized 
government banks, led by Rural Finance Programme at Ohio State University, argue 
that the rationing mechanism to screen risky Porrowers failed due to the subsidized 
low interest rates, and funds were too cheap to act as an incentive for the poor to 
invest; they were more likely to consume. The poverty remained, while loan re- 
payment rates plummeted. Braverman & Guasch (1986) find that, with very few 
exceptions, subsidized credit programmes often ended up with default rates between 
40% to 95%. The poor household could have been better off without the subsidies 
(McKinnon (1973), Gonzalez-Vega (1984). 
From the middle of the 1970s, microfinance started to become a popular credit 
strategy to replace the government-led subsidized programmes. Originating from the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the microfinance movement aims to solve problems 
of subsidized credit and find the way to reach the poor people in a more efficient 
way. The most striking idea is to lend to a group of borrowers rather than to an 
individual. This ultimately solves many problems: firstly, no collateral is required; 
secondly, the joint-liability condition of the group loan contract helps to overcome 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection by enforcing the peer monitoring 
among group members. The success of Grameen had led to its replications in many 
other countries, including Vietnam. 
In Vietnam, by the late 1980s, under the pressure of potential political and 
economic crisis, Vietnam started to transform its "central-planned" into "market- 
oriented" economy, the "Doi MoO (reformation) programme as in Vietnamese. 
The reform has achieved remarkable successes, creating one of the fastest growing 
economies in the world. At the centre of "Doi Moil' is agricultural transformation: 
collectivist production was abandoned; irrigable land was reallocated to households. 
From the beginning of the transformation process, the Vietnamese government has 
focussed its economic policy toward balancing development between rural and ur- 
ban areas. The rural credit markets in Vietnam, therefore, has received substantial 
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investment (World Bank, 1999). In 1999 as many as 5.9 million households had 
access to formal financial institutions, of which 2.7 million households were poor 
and low-income households (McCarty, 2001). 
This thesis is a study of Vietnamese rural credit markets in 1990s. It sets out to 
answer three questions: what are the determinant factors of household's accessibility 
to the formal credit sector in rural Vietnam? What are the determinants of credit 
amount obtained by households? and what are the impacts of taking credit? 
1.2 Contributions and Outline of the Dissertation 
The thesis is organised in four main chapters. The first chapter aims to provide 
an overview of the Vietnamese rural credit markets in 1990s, using data from the 
Vietnam Living Standard Survey. Evidence from the VLSS data shows a big expan- 
sion of the formal credit sector in rural Vietnam. From a low 30% market share in 
1992/93, the formal sector had grown to account for 50% of the rural credit mar- 
ket in 1997/98, although the development is not well-balanced across regions and 
households quintile by expenditure per capita. Formal funding is cheaper in term of 
interest rates but more often requires collateral in comparison with informal source. 
Average interest rates of both sectors had been cut by almost two third over time be- 
tween the surveys, indicating a growing competition between lenders. However, the 
existence of informal lenders remains strong, presenting a complex linkages between 
agents in the credit markets. 
The second chapter is a study of the determinants factors of credit accessibility of 
Vietnamese rural households, with concentration on access to the formal sector. We 
aims to estimate the demand and the supply channels separately. The demand for 
formal credit is identified by variable capturing health status of household members. 
The formal supply is identified by commune-level formal credit per capita, which 
reflects operation of formal lenders in the studied communes. We bases our analysis 
on the bivariate probit model with partial observability. This model is employed to 
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address the problem of limited information on the non-borrowing households. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of Vietriamese rural credit markets 
that allows supply of and demand for credit to be estimated distinctly. 
Estimation results from this chapter present evidence of the impacts of eco- 
nomic development on credit behaviour of rural households. The role of household 
characteristics determining level of access to the formal sector is differed over the 
years between the two surveys, implying the changes of economic environment. The 
distinction between the demand for formal and informal credit arises from the ob- 
servable variables, such as physical asset or human capital, reflecting household 
demand for investment capital. The supply of formal credit depends significantly 
on informational variables like distance from commune to the nearest bank branch. 
Prediction of formal credit market participation is high and increases over years, 
implying the expansion of the formal sector. The demand for formal credit is also 
inflated, suggesting household's need for investment capital grows with economic 
development. 
The empirical analysis of chapter three highlights the determinant factors of 
credit amount obtained. The employed econometric models view probability of 
participating in credit markets and credit amount received as a joint determination 
of the function of household's demand for credit and the function of lender's decision 
on supply. The results of this chapter imply some important policy implications. 
First, even though formal credit network continues to expand greatly to cover most 
rural areas, there is question on the outreach and flexibility of credit services. Credit 
scoring system should be developed to reduce collateral requirement which actually 
considered as one of the most constraints for formal credit access. Land regulations 
and fixed asset legal entitlement should be reviewed together with improvement of 
administration efficiency to enable households to use their fixed property as collateral 
for credit. 
The last chapter aims to assess the impact of formal credit on household con- 
sumption. Analyses using cross-section and longitudinal data have been used. In- 
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strumental variable method is employed to tease out the impact of credit on house- 
hold consumption from other potential influences and biases. Results suggest that 
borrowing from the formal sector significantly improves consumption per capita of 
borrowing households. The challenges in impact assessments arise because credit 
is not provided to random households. On one hand, from the supply side, for- 
mal credit institutions carefully select areas to provide their financial services. The 
selected area is not necessary having "better" economic conditions compared to 
others, it may be poorer as result of credit targeted. However, by comparing the 
incidence of poverty in credit available and credit unavailable areas, which axe dif- 
ferent in characteristics, researchers may mistakenly report biased results. On the 
other hand, from the demand side, households who have taken credit may be sys- 
tematically different from others who have not. When the characteristics that cause 
these differences are observable (e. g. age, education, assets) and are taken into ac- 
count, impact evaluation would be less problematic. However, the differences often 
arise from self-selection process, which are driven by unobserved traits of borrowers, 
such as ability. A simple evaluation of credit programme without calculating these 
attributions will be biased. 
We use instrumental variable to identify the credit amount that household ob- 
tained. The variables of credit per capita at commune-level, distance from commune 
committee to the nearest government bank branch (in form of log-transformation 
and dummy) are employed as the instruments. Our results are consistent with other 
studies of the Vietnamese rural credit maxkets (e. g. Pham et al (2002)) that also find 
positive and significant effects of credit on consumption. In particular, we find in 
our panel analysis that 1 percent increase in average credit per capita borrowed from 
the formal sector leads to 0.26 percent increase in average consumption per capita. 
Controlling for selection biases has been shown to be very important. In our study, 
estimations using simple OLS regression lead us to conclusion of no effects of credit. 
This result is clearly underestimated the more reliable (positive) results in which 
biases have been carefully addressed. However, a reservation should be pointed out. 
That is our core instrumental variables are at commune-level. These are useful to 
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control for intra-communal differences in formal credit accessibility but they do not 
allow controlling for inter-communal or household-level unobserved characteristics. 
Although this problem has been addressed by using household fixed-bffects, and by 
cluster-robust test statistics and standard errors, results might be different if other 
instrumental variables had been used. 
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Chapter 2 
The Vietnamese Rural Credit 
Market in the 1990s 
2.1 Introduction 
From independence in 1975 to mid-1980s, Vietnam remained as one of the poorest 
countries in the world. The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1985 was 
US$130 per year, placing Vietnam in the group of five poorest countries Glewwe 
(2004). Although school enrollment rates and life expectancy were relatively high 
compared to other poor countries in the same category in Africa, Latin America and 
South Asia, Vietnam's low income meant that the majority of the population was 
living in extreme poverty. 
For more than a decade after the war, and similar to other communist countries, 
Vietnam's economy had been central planned where most production and resources 
were controlled by the government. Agricultural production had been organised in 
cooperatives, free trade was illegal, and goods and products could not move from one 
province to others without government's approval. In that framework, the economy 
did not grow and the inflation rate rose dramatically as government printed money 
to finance their deficitsi. 
'The annual inflation rate was recorded at 487 percent in 1986 
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In 1986, in response to poor economic performance that could push the country 
into the danger of economic and political crisis, Vietnam started its economic reno- 
vation ("Doi Moi") policy. A series of fundamental policies changes was gradually 
implemented, including legalisation of private economic activities, termination of 
price control, and reform of agricultural sector which is considered as one of the 
most important policy changes. By 1989, agricultural cooperatives were fully dis- 
mantled and farm households were allowed to cultivate on their land portions under 
lease contracts from the government. Agricultural reform rapidly turned Vietnam 
from a rice-importing country to one of the world's largest rice exporters. 
There were regional differences that are likely to vary the pace of economic 
transition, especially the pace of agrarian transformation. After the re-unification 
in 1975, the collectivisation process of rural production for provinces in the South 
was far behind compared to those in the North. By the time Vietnam started its de- 
collectivisation in 1986, less than 10 percent of all of Southern farmers had joined 
collectives while almost all agricultural production in the North was collectivised 
(Pingali and Xuan, 1992). This is one of many reasons that market economy was 
more developed in the South at the beginning of the transition. 
In 1988, two years after the economic reform started, the financial system reform 
was also implemented. For a long period before that, the Vietnamese banking sys- 
tem had a socialist mono-bank form in which the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) was 
the only entity (Roman, 1997). The role of the SBV was limited to implementing 
government decisions on resource allocation or, more precisely, to financing state- 
owned enterprises. Demand for credit from private sector was low. People had little 
incentive and opportunity to expand private production due to its illegalised status. 
Moreover, there was literally no private agricultural production as most of produc- 
tion activities are collectivised. As a result, in this period the informal credit sector 
essentially satisfied all private demand (Do, Le, Nguyen and Dinh, 2001). However, 
the economic reform, the de-collectivisation and liberalisation of agricultural pro- 
duction, and the privatisation of small-scale trade and industry generated demand 
for investment capital. The financial system therefore needed to be restructured 
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to meet the requirement of economic development. In March 1988, the mono-bank 
system was broken into a two-tier system, with the SBV playing the role of central 
bank, and a number of independent commercial banks. Ten years later, by 1998, 
besides the SBV, the banking system included four large state-owned commercial 
banks 27 41 joint-stock commercial banks, 977 People's Credit Funds (PCFs), 50 
cooperatives, and a small number of joint-venture banks and foreign bank branches 
(SBV, 1998). The stock market was opened in 2000 but remained small with limited 
channels for mobilizing capital and fewer than 30 companies listed in 2004. 
Of the four state-owned commercial banks, the Vietnam Bank for Agricultural 
and Rural Development (VBARD) is the largest one in term of total capital and 
number of branches. It is also the key commercial bank serving rural areas and 
supporting development of rural production. In response to increasing demand of 
private credit and to enforce government policy of balancing economic growth and 
poverty reduction between rural and urban regions, the Government established in 
1995 the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP)', a specialised government bank aimed 
at providing subsidised and directed credit for poor people, improving the out-reach 
and accessibility to formal credit for poorest householdS4. However, in rural areas 
informal credit continues to dominate the market in which relatives and money 
lenders are the most important sources of supply. The formal sector had expanded 
rapidly along with economic development to acquire 50 percent of market share in 
1998 from about 30 percent in 1993 (Table A. 4). 
As seen in the figure A. 1, the shares of agriculture in total GDP, export and 
employment have steadily decreased. Since the beginning to the end of 1990s, con- 
tribution of agriculture to GDP has been cut in half, from 40 percent to almost 20 
percent. Although agriculture remains its important role in rural areas with the 
2Namely the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the Vietnam's 
Commercial and Industrial Bank (Vietincombank), the Vietnam Bank for Foreign Trade (Viet- 
combank) and the Vietnam Investment and Development Bank (Vietindbank) 
3 In 2004, VBP was restructured and renamed as the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. However, 
through out this thesis we sill use the name of VBP as it was during our study period. 
'Because of the similarity in characteristics and operations, and of the fact that VBP operating 
via VBARD branch network, we should understand VBARD as referring to both VBARD and 
VBP except otherwise state. 
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share of four fifths of the country's population, its contribution to employment has 
declined progressively. By 2003, agriculture employs about 60 percent of labour 
force, down from 75 percent in 1990. 
Agricultural land-use right was first privatised and then free exchange of land 
was legalised, formally in the first Land Law introduced in 1993. Questioning the 
efficiency of land reallocation during this period, a study of Ravallion et al (2006) 
concludes that the agrarian transition process favoured the "land-poor". In other 
words, households who possess low (high) amount of crop land under collective 
production would tend to see their land holding increased (decreased) over studying 
time. In another study, Do et al (2007) investigate the impact of land titling on 
rural production and find that households in provinces where the authorities have 
made better progress in issuing land-use right documents devote higher proportion 
of their land to multi-year crops and spend more time on non-farm work. They, 
however, do not find impact of land titling on household borrowing amount, even 
though farmers would have greater access to credit markets as they could pledge 
land as collateral. 
Ten years after the economic reform, Vietnam's GDP growth rate had been main- 
tained at about 8% annually. GDP per capita increased more than three times from 
USD130 in 1985 to almost USD400 in 2000 (see Table A. 1). The proportion of people 
with per capita expenditures under the total poverty line has dropped dramatically 
from 58% in 1993 to 37% in 1998 (World Bank, 1999). Continuing through the 
1990s, the Vietnamese economy transformed itself from a poor and closed economy 
into one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of economic growth, 
poverty reduction, and increased household welfare (Glewwe, 2004). This chapter 
plans to review a part of that remarkable transformation: the rural credit markets; 
using data from the Vietnam Living Standard Survey in 1992/93 and 1997/98. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 will briefly discuss the VLSS 
and the sample. Section 2.3 provides a review of rural credit markets, focusing 
on the characteristics of rural households, the expansion of formal credit sector, 
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the features of loan contracts, and the linkages between formal and informal credit 
sector. Section 2.4 is conclusion. 
2.2 The Vietnam Living Standard Survey 
The primary data source used in this thesis is the Vietnam Living Standard Survey 
(VLSS) conducted in 1992/93 and 1997/98 by the General Statistical Office of the 
Government of Vietnam (GSO), funded by United Nation Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank. The surveys contain detailed information of 4,800 
households from 150 communes in VLSS1992/93 and 6,000 households from 194 
communes in VLSS1997/98. These surveys were constructed to create a panel data. 
As many households as possible that had already been interviewed in 1992/93 were 
sampled again in 1997/98. For some reasons, 495 households from VLSS1992/93 
were not re-interviewed. To reach 6,000 households in the 1997/98 survey, an addi- 
tional 1,695 households were selected from the total sample of 1995 Multi-Purpose 
Household Survey of the GSO. 
Vietnam is geophysically divided into seven regions that internally are relatively 
homogeneous. Both 1992/93 and 1997/98 VLSS bases on this region category as 
basis for sampling, namely the Northern Uplands, the Red River Delta, the North 
Central Coast, the South Central Coast, the South East, the Highlands and the 
Mekong Delta. The Northern Uplands, Highlands and North Central Coast are the 
three poorest regions (see Figure A. 2). For both surveys, samples were weighted 
basing on the statistics of Vietnam Population Census in 1989 with approximately 
80% of Vietnamese households lived in rural areas. Commune samples were ran- 
domly selected from a total of proximately 10,000 communes in 646 districts, and 
64 provinces and cities in Vietnam, and then an average of 32 households were ran- 
domly selected for interview in each commune. For the purpose of the thesis, we 
select only households who are residing in rural areas at the time of the surveys, 
which are including 3839 households in 120 communes for VLSS1992/93, and 4269 
households in 150 communes for VLSS1997/98. Design of the VLSS allows us to 
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employ both cross-sectional and panel analyses. The panel data consisting 3,364 
rural households will be used in Chapter 5. 
The two surveys are similar in many respects which provide data in both house- 
hold and commune levels. The household questionnaire was based on the format of 
the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement Surveys with adaptation to Viet- 
namese characteristics. The surveys collected information of household as a whole 
and also information of individuals within that household, such as personal profile, 
education, health status, employment, agriculture production, housing, consump- 
tion, credit and saving activities. For information on credit activities, households 
are asked to report whether they borrow any money from other individuals or organ- 
isations within the last 12 months, and details of loan they taken including source 
of loan, amount, duration, interest rate and collateral. The commune questionnaire 
was only applied to rural areas, collected basic data on commune geographical infor- 
mation, general economic conditions, transportation and infrastructure, and credit'. 
The data processing are divided into two stages, the actual field interview and 
the final data process at the GSO office in Hanoi. In the first stage, the VLSS 
team calls for two rounds of interviews and data were entried in the field itself. 
Data collected in the first round is checked by the supervisor prior to the second 
round and necessary clarifications sought from the concerned household during the 
second round. All interviews were carefully supervised by senior staffs of the GSO 
and consultants of the World Bank. They observed some interviews and randomly 
revisited some of the interviewed households to check the quality of the work. In the 
second stage, at the GSO head office in Hanoi, the field data were intensively checked 
and corrected by senior experts using the questionnaires and the original recorded 
information. The data files were then processed to produce STATA data-sets, which 
are weighted and ready for use by researched. The VLSSs have been used by the 
GSO, the World Bank and the UN to calculate poverty lines for Vietnam in many 
reports (see, e. g., World Bank (1999), UNDP(2000)). No serious problems with the 
5Credit; questionnaire at communce level is only available in VLSS1997/98 6Calculation of sampling weights can be found in the GSO's Basic Information (GSO (2000) 
and GSO(2001)) 
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data have been uncovered. 
General statistics for households, household heads and conununes for VLSS1992/93 
and VLSS1997/98 are presented in Table A. 2 and Table A. 3, respectively. Defini- 
tion and construction of variables used in the thesis can be found in Appendix E. 
As stated in the survey basic information documents from the GSO and the World 
Bank (i. e., GSO and World Bank (2000), GSO and World Bank (2001), Haughton 
et al (2001)), the VLSS data can be used directly without further weighting. All the 
results presented from hereon in this thesis come from the analysis of VLSS1992/93 
and VLSS1997/98 unless otherwise stated. 
Before moving to the next section which present stylised facts of Vietnamese 
rural credit market, it is appropriate at this point to define some key terms used 
extensively in the thesis. The formal credit sector consists all organised credit in- 
stitutions (formal lenders), including Government banks (Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development, Bank for the Poor and other government banks), credit pro- 
grammes (poverty alleviation programmes, job creation programmes), credit coop- 
eratives, People's Credit E'und, and private banks. The informal sector includes 
individuals and non-organised credit providers (informal lenders), such as money 
lenders, relatives, friends, and rotated saving and credit associations (ROSCA). For- 
mal borrowers are individuals or households who take loans from the formal lenders. 
Similarly, informal borrowers are those who borrow from the informal lenders. Other 
definitions and variable descriptions could be found in Appendix E. 
2.3 Credit Markets for Rural Households 
During 1990s, the financial sector in Vietnam was progressively developed in parallel 
with overall economic transformation and increased demarid for credit from private 
sector. However, similar to other developing countries, the Vietnamese financial 
system remains largely underdeveloped with a dual structure in which formal and 
informal sectors exist side by side. At the corporate level, the financial system was 
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dominated by state-owned commercial banks with over 75 percent of outstanding 
bank credit (World Bank (2007, p. 25)), leaving niche markets for joint-stock and 
private banks. In contrast to corporate credit market, the formal sector played a 
smaller role in providing credit for households, especially for poor households in 
rural areas. In 1993, the formal sector accounted for less than 30 percent of loans 
while the informal sector provided over 70 percent of loans made to rural households 
(see Table A. 9). 
This section will provide a background picture of Vietnam's rural credit markets 
in the 1990s. We first discuss the general characteristics of households and communes 
using the VLSS data. Comparison between borrowers and non-borrowers will be 
made. We then analyse the structure of rural credit markets emphasising on the 
expansion of formal sector as well as highlighting strong existence of informal lenders 
over five year between the two surveys. We finally discuss how the markets are 
divided by looking at the interaction of loan and household characteristics. 
2.3.1 Characteristics of Households and Communes in the 
Sample 
The characteristics of rural households are presented in the Tables A. 2 and A. 3 for 
the two surveys on 1992/93 and 1997/98, respectively. 1985 households (51.71%) in 
1992/3 and 2334 households (54.69%) in 1997/8 are reported to have taken credit 
within the 12-months period prior to the survey date, regardless of the loan sources. 
In 1992/93, the majority of heads of households are male (77%) and married 
(82%), with averaged age of 45 years. It appears that borrow6rs are younger than 
average by almost two years, more likely to be male (79%) and married (84%). The 
seven percent difference in gender of household head in both 1992/93 and 1997/98 
between formal borrowers (82%) and non-borrowers (75%) shows that male-headed 
households seem to borrow more often than female-headed households. This suggests 
that men may be more active than women in credit participation. This is also true 
for married household head, indicating increase of credit activity in more stable 
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households. The figures also show differences in age, gender and marital status 
between households who took loans from formal sources and those who took loans 
from informal sources, although the variations are not substantial. Changes of these 
variables across the surveys are also small. 
The average household size in 1992/93 is just less than five people while number 
of working adults in household is almost three 7. Those who are not borrowing have 
smaller indicators in both terms which, in turn, suggests that smaller size households 
seem to borrow less. This feature is sensible in agricultural production where most 
households would use domestic labour in farm work and only hire external labour 
as the last alternative which is again often in labour exchange (Nguyen, 2007). 
Bigger households or, more importantly, households with higher number of working 
adults imply more labour input for production and therefore expansion may be more 
feasible. If saving is not enough to finance investment, borrowing is always an option, 
resulting in higher demand for credit. Using this reasoning to explain demand for 
consumption credit, it appears that large households consume more and again may 
be exposed to higher demand for consumption loans. In 1997/98, household size 
(5-17) and working-adult number (2.89) of the borrowing households are also larger 
than that of the non-borrowing households (4.51 and 2.76, respectively). 
The average education level of household head is lower secondary school, or about 
6 schooling years. Households who borrow from the formal sector does have higher 
education than average, but the difference is relatively small. 
Approximately 80 percent of rural households work in agricultural production, 
as expected. A slightly lower number in 1997/98 suggests that off-farm employment 
becomes more popular and agricultural production plays less important role in the 
rural economy in parallel with progressing the industrialisation process. Average 
statistics of commune non-farm employment increase from 46 percent to 55 percent 
confirms this movement (also see Figure A. 1). However, it is important to note that 
there is a big increase in household's annual-crop-land holding size from about 920 
7We count any family member age between 16 and 60 as a working adult. 
16 
m2 in 1992/93 to almost three times higher of 2,643 0 in 1997/98. This transforma- 
tion was triggered by de-collectivisation of agricultural production started in 1988 
which reallocated cultivated land previously farmed in cooperative to households. 
Looking at general statistics in Table A. 2 and Table A. 3, formal borrowers ac- 
tually acquire larger land holding than non-borrowers and informal borrowers'. In- 
tuitively, smaller landholding size households may, on one hand, have less input for 
investment expansion, and therefore have less demand for credit. On the other hand, 
less land holding means the households may be poorer or may have less access to 
credit generally. Either of these will reduce borrowing propensity, as we will see in 
the next chapters. I 
In both surveys, statistics on variables of house ownership, total housing area and 
house value of formal borrowers are higher than those of sample average which in turn 
higher than those of informal borrowers, although the difference is not remarkable. 
About 97 percent of households reports legal ownership of their house. This is not a 
surprise as rural people are less mobile in comparison to urban people. It is typical 
to see a household with several generations living together and houses transferred 
between generations. As a house is one of the most popular assets and is often used 
as collateral for loans, it is in line with our expectation to see that these housing 
variables are larger for formal borrowers. 
2.3.2 The Expansion of Formal Credit Sector 
This section describes the picture of market's lenders and the distribution of lenders 
according to borrower's various sorting category. There are some terms and defin- 
itions we would like to make clear before going further. Firstly, borrowers are not 
individuals but households on debt at the time of the surveys. A borrower will be- 
long to both types of formal and informal borrowers, if he borrows from both formal 
and informal sources. Secondly, due to the fact that a household could borrow more 
8We do not have information on household's land-use documents. Annual crop land-holding 
size variable is the total of land size possessed by household regardless of land title. 
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than one loan at one time, to simplify we define formal borrowing as sum of all 
loans that a household borrow from formal lenders, and informal borrowing as sum 
of all loans that a household borrow from informal lenders. It is assumed that loan 
characteristics are homogenous for a household within a sector. 
As mentioned in the previous section, nearly 55 percent of households in rural 
areas were borrowing in 1998, up slightly from 51 percent in 1993. Among borrowers, 
82 percent of them borrow from one sector, either formal or informal, and 18 percent 
borrows from both sectors (see Table A. 4). The notable point is the expansion of 
formal sector and the still strong existence of informal market. 
According to household borrowing data in Table A. 4, over 5 years the market 
share of informal lenders has been cut in half from about 60 percent to almost 30 
percent in number of borrowers, excluding those who borrow from both sources. 
Formal borrowers have increased to nearly 50 percent from the quite low number 
of 23 percent. This expansion of formal sector was led by the VBARD and VBP, 
which tend to 80 percent of formal borrowers and account for 90 percent of total 
formal loan amount in 1998. 
However, the development of formal sector and household borrowing activities 
are not uniformly distributed across regions. Table A. 5 shows that while families 
from the North Central Coast were most likely to borrow in 1993, those from the 
South East was the least with about 42 percent. Because the Red River Delta is 
one of the two rice granaries of Vietnam' and one of the most active economic areas 
of the economy, it is surprised that households here borrow less than most other 
regions (actually it came as the second lowest borrowing regions in 1993) especially 
in comparison with the Mekong Delta. From 1993 to 1998, borrowing became more 
popular in most regions, except the South Central Coast where the borrowing rate 
dropped dramatically from 50 percent to 38 percent of its population. 
The regional variation also reflects in the sources of credit. In some regions, 
particularly in the Highlands in 1993, the role of formal institutions was relatively 
9The other is Mekong Delta 
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weak with only 25 percent of market share. Formal sector borrowing was most 
popular in the North Central Coast at that time. The picture however changed 
dramatically by 1998. Formal institutions became almost three times more populax 
in the Highlands, lending to 70 percent of borrowers. The increasing role of formal 
credit in the Highlands could 1ýe interpreted as the result of government economic 
policy in an attempt to balance economic development among regions (World Bank, 
1999). Market share of the formal sector also increased impressively in other regions. 
The smallest market share was in the Red River Delta of 53 percent. Informal 
lenders seem to be crowded out by the formal sector expansion although retaining 
its prominent role. 
In addition to the fragmented picture of borrowing activities across regions, credit 
access also diverse among borrowing households categorised by quintile expenditure 
per capita (see Table A. 6 and Table A. 7). In the formal sector, the most often bor- 
rowing tends to come from poorer household and the biggest amount of borrowing 
comes from the middle quintile households. The former might result from higher 
demand for consumption credit of poor households, which is asserted by its outstand- 
ing rate of informal borrowing. The small share of formal credit for this quintile is 
no surprise. Conversely, households from upper quintile borrow less frequently but 
when they borrow they do borrow more often from formal banks and borrow larger 
amount (A. 7). This result implies that richer households seem to have greater access 
to formal credit as they would have more valuable collateralisable assets. 
2.3.3 Features of Loan Contracts 
The discussion so far has presented the structure of rural financial system with the 
complex coexistence of formal and informal sector. In what follows, we inspect the 
differences between formal and informal lending attributions by looking at charac- 
teristics of loan contracts provided by each sector. 
Interest rate 
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The characteristics of loan contracts including interest rates are presented in 
Table A. 9 and Table A. 10. In the formal sector, 75 percent of loans in 1993 and 
95 percent of loans in 1998 are charged with positive interest rates. By contrast, 
in the informal sector, where friends and relatives are the main sources of credit, 
nearly 90 percent of loans from relatives in 1993 and 1998 are interest-free. However, 
as one could expect, 97 percent of loans from money lenders included in the two 
surveys is charged interest, sometimes at extremely high rates. In the study of 
Thailand's rural credit market in 1984-85, Siarnwalla et al (1990) find that money 
lenders charge interest rates of up to 120 percent annually. In another case, Aleem 
(1990) also reports informal interest rates in rural areas of Pakistan of about 80 
percent a year. It is no different in Vietnam. 
In 1992/93, the average nominal annual interest rate charged by formal credit 
institutions was 46 percent. Within the formal sectors, VBARD and VBP provide. 
loans with the lowest interest of 42 percent while private bank and other govern- 
ment organisations, e. g., job creation programmes impose 60 percent and 80 percent 
interest rates, respectively. It is no surprise to see that informal loans are charged 
at much higher interest rates. One could possibly borrow a non-interest loan from 
relatives or friends, but if one has to pay interest one would have to pay more with 
informal borrowing. The average annual interest rate for informal loans was 92 
percent, within which money lenders charging 110 percent (Table A. 9). 
The expansion of formal credit sector, more availability and higher accessibility of 
formal funds may be part of the explanation for the cut in interest rates by almost 
two third of the 1993 rates. In 1997/98, formal interest rates was 15 percent on 
average and the informal interest rates was 38 percent. VBARD and VBP continues 
to be the cheapest sources for interest-bearing loans. Money lenders are of the most 
expensive, charging 50 percent annually on their credit (Table A. 10). Relatives 
are the most frequent lenders providing interest-free loans, although there might 
be other hidden costs that we do not observe such as social and other obligations 
attached to such loans. 
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The VBARD and VBP's interest rates are determined within the interest rate 
framework specified by the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). With the dominant role 
in the formal sector, the impact of VBARD's interest rates is crucial. A survey by 
McCarty (2001) finds that 50 percent of institutions referred to VBARD's rate as 
the guide interest rates while only 20 percent of them decided interest rates basing on 
operational cost and financial sustainability. These exogenously determined interest 
rates potentially have significant effect on the business of lenders. As it has been 
generally accepted in rural finance literature (see, e. g., Hoff et al (1990)), interest 
rates could be used as an indirect screening mechanism for lenders to select less risky 
borrowers. By setting interest rate without considering local market conditions and 
applicants' characteristics, lenders are unable to ration out risky borrowers without 
employing other screening methods. Consequently, formal lenders usually consider 
collateral assets as the effective tool against risk and to maintain the repayment 
rate. Credit guarantees from local government administration is also applied but 
far less often. 
In terms of interest rates only, formal loans appear to be much cheaper than 
informal loans. So, why are some households willing to pay higher interest rates to 
borrow from informal lenders? Or put another way, why do people accept to pay 3.2 
percent a month for a loan if another loan is available at 1.2 percent? One possible 
explanation is formal sector does not supply credit to satisfy all of the demand. 
There are households being refused to access formal credit services and therefore 
have to turn to informal credit sector. 
Loan duration, loan size and collateral 
In a loan contract, there are other important attributions beside interest rates, 
including the amount and length of the loan, or the requirement of collateral. Gen- 
erally, the formal sector provides loans with larger amounts, longer durations but 
more often requiring collateral compared with the informal sector. In 1992/93, the 
average size for loans from the formal sector was VND906 thousands, in which the 
largest size of VND1,090 thousands came from VBARD loans". Loans from the 
IOVND1,090 thounsand equals USD97. VND//USD exchange rates in the 1990s axe in Table 
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informal sector were smaller on average, VND820 thousand, but money lenders ap- 
pear to provide the biggest average loan amount of VND1200 thousand, suggesting 
the limited availability of formal funding by that time. Additionally, the length of 
formal loans are observed to be almost 2 months shorter than the length of informal 
loans. Especially, VBARD loans are lent on average of 6 months duration which is 
a surprise as 87 percent of VBARD loans are repoited as capital for investment (see 
Table A. 12). 
The pattern of loan contracts, notably the differences between the formal and 
the informal, were changed remarkably from 1992/93 to 1997/98. Formal sector 
provides longer loan duration while keep lending at larger loan size. VBARD became 
the largest credit provider with the average loan amount of VND4,100 thousand for 
the length of one and a half year. This suggests that formal lenders have aimed to 
provide long-term investment credit. For the loans obtained from informal lenders, 
the average term to maturity remained short at about 10 months, with the average 
amount of VND2,300 thousand. Due to its intrinsic characteristics of short-term, 
relatively small amount and high interest rate, more than 50 percent of informal 
loans are for consumption, especially loans from relatives with nearly 70 percent in 
1998 (see Table A. 12). 
Although the formal loans appears to be cheaper, in term of interest rates, a 
large proportion of population still matches their demand with informal borrowing. 
One important barrier to access the formal sector is the requirement of physical 
collateral and/or guarantors. As presented in Table A. 9 and Table A. 10,50 percent 
and 75 percent of formal loans, in 1993 and 1998 respectively, ask for collateral 
assets, such as house, land or durable goods. The collateralising rate is even higher 
with VBARD, at 76 percent and 87 percent in that two years. Land and house are 
the most common type of collateral, accounting for 90 percent of all cases (Table 
A. 11). In contrast to the formal sector, the informal sector usually does not require 
collateral for their loans: only 5.4 percent of all loans in 1993 and 3.7 percent in 
1998. 
A. 1. 
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Because of collateral requirement and other obstacles, e. g. bureaucracy and red 
tape, some rural households may not even try to apply for formal loans as they may 
preemptively assume that their applications would not be approved. In addition, 
even if some poor households may be able to provide collateral, many of them 
are simply afraid to risk using their land as it is their only means of subsistence 
UNDP (2000). This phenomenon is called credit self-rationing, where some people 
considered themselves out of formal credit market a priori. Therefore, although 
being considered as the cheaper source -of credit, the formal sector would not be 
accessible to all households. 
Thus, even though informal lenders provide credit that normally carries higher 
interest rates, shorter term and smaller size than credit from formal institutions, 
they still find demand for their loans. This reflects the segmented characteristic 
of Vietnamese rural credit market where particular lenders serve clients of their 
own market. It is widely reported in the literature that poor rural households are 
often less creditworthy. Lending in rural areas is arguably more expensive due to 
high transaction cost, small loan size and remoteness of clients. Lending to poor 
rural households is even suffered from more drawbacks as they axe less likely to 
have collateralisable assets and lending without collateral is just riskier. As a result, 
formal lenders have less incentive to expand their operations in rural parts, specially 
in remote areas. Thus, a significant proportion of households may be left with no 
other option but finding their credit supply from the informal market. 
2.3.4 Linkages between Formal and Informal Credit Sectors 
The interactions and coexistence alongside each other of formal and informal credit 
sector in underdeveloped rural credit market have been well reported in the economic 
literature (see, e. g., Bell (1990), Bell et al (1997), Hoff & Stiglitz (1997), and Jain 
(1999)). As discussed in the previous section, the Vietnamese rural credit market 
has b een divided into almost two halves in 1998: 49.7 percent of the number of loans 
was from the formal sector, and 50.3 percent from the informal sector (see Table 
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A. 10). Although the two sectors typically compete with one another, they may also 
complement each other in a number of fundamental ways. For example, informal 
lenders could provide credit for households who are involuntarily excluded from for- 
mal credit services. Households who could not satisfy their demand by borrowing 
from institutional market, or in other words those who are partially rationed by for- 
mal lenders, could find their supplemental credit from informal sources. Jain (1999) 
suggests an explanation for this phenomenon using the informational differences 
between the two sectors that formal lenders may intend to partly finance some bor- 
rowers and therefore forcing them to seek informal lenders for the remainder of their 
credit demand. By doing this, formal institutions could indirectly screen borrowers 
over the information advantages of informal lenders. The evidence of the spillover of 
credit demand and the complement of formal and informal market in rural Vietnam 
is revealed in table AA represented in the stylised fact that 16.27 percent and 18.59 
percent of indebted households in 1993 and 1998 borrowed from both credit sectors. 
Another explanation for this simultaneous two-sector borrowing is that formal bor- 
rowers may face unexpected consumption money demand such as unforeseen events 
of illness, accident or funeral. It is less likely that formal institutions are willing 
to supply consumption credit, if any, without time-consuming complex procedures. 
Hence the quick and simple way to obtain cash is from informal sources, including 
relatives and friends. 
Additionally, formal institutions could finance excluded households indirectly by 
lending to local money lenders who then onlend to those formally rationed. This 
interaction between the two sectors has been studied theoretically (e. g. Varghese 
(2005), Floro & Ray (1997), Andersen et al (2006)) and empirically (e. g. Bell et al 
(1997), Gine (2005)) emphasizing the advantages of local lenders on screening and 
observing borrowers' behaviours. In the case of Vietnam, we find that among all 
household lenders, almost 49 percent of them are also borrowing from a third party 
in both year 1993 and 1998". This finding is striking. It implies a complex picture 
of credit activities in rural areas. How do we explain the existence of such credit 
"There are 654 household lenders in 1993 in which 315 of them (48.99%) also borrow. The 
numbers in 1998 are 655 lenders and 323 borrowing lenders (49.31%). 
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agents? And what are their roles in the rural credit market? 
There are several possible explanations. In one case, borrowing lenders may 
have good access to formal sector, hence, have access to low interest credit. Then 
they can lend to other households or individuals using the credit they borrowed 
and make profit from this lending. Given the laxge differences between formal and 
informal interest rates 12 , there are incentives for people to become the middlemen. 
Especially in markets where credit institutions fail to satisfy the whole demand 
for credit, the existence of credit intermediaries is an important channel to supply 
funds to creditworthy households. In other cases, borrowing lenders may have lent 
their money and later have to borrow from other sources in the unexpected event 
that they could not re-collect their lent money in time. This kind of consumption 
smoothing borrowing is also observed by Udry (1995) in his study of the Nigerian 
rural market. 
Statistics on source of credit for borrowing lenders and other borrowers13 are 
presented in Table A. 13. It reveals that about 42 percent and 61 percent of the 
borrowing lenders borrow from formal sector in 1993 and 1998 respectively. These 
numbers are not as high as expected. Specifically, borrowing lenders do borrow more 
often from VBARD (74.24 percent in 1993 and 83.82 percent in 1998) than other 
borrowerS14 (64.26 percent and 81.71 percent) but in general, borrowing lenders 
even borrow less from formal source than normal borrowers in 1998. Borrowing 
from relatives and other individuals is surprisingly common. This evidence suggests 
the hypothesis that the financial intermediation may occur not only from the formal 
sector to the informal sector but also within the informal sector. Borrowing lenders 
may not be necessary to have better access to formal credit. However if they do, one 
may expect to see the monopoly rent on top of the loans they onlend to others. This 
is often called the profit of information advantages or in other cases, the premium 
for the risk that borrowing lenders have to bear while lending to less creditworthy 
12The interest rate differences between formal and informal sector are about 46 percent and 23 
percent in 1993 and 1998 respectively (see table A. 2 and table A. 3 for details) 13Borrowing lenders are households that borrow and lend simultaneously. Other borrowers 
include households that borrow but do not lend. "Those borrowing but not lending 
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households. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the Vietnamese rural credit markets in 
1990s. It also presents description and definition of the Vietnam Living Standard 
Survey in 1992/93 and 1997/98, which will be the primary data for our analysis 
throughout the thesis. 
The Vietnamese economic reform started by the end of 1980s had achieved a 
remarkable progress during 1990s, over the time of the VLSS surveys. Agricultural 
transformation and rural development were rec'ognised as two of the most successful 
results of "Doi Moi ". In just 5 years from 1992 to 1997, poverty rates were reduced 
from 58% to 37% of the population. 
Evidence from the VLSS data shows a big expansion of the formal credit sector 
in rural Vietnam. Rom a low 30% market share in 1992/93, the formal sector had 
grown to account for 50% of the rural credit market in 1997/98, although the devel- 
opment is not well-balanced across regions and households quintile by expenditure 
per capita. Formal funding is cheaper in term of interest rates but more often re- 
quires collateral in comparison with informal source. Average Interest rates of both 
sectors had been cut by almost two third over time between the surveys, indicating 
a growing competition between lenders. However, the existence of informal lenders 
remains strong, presenting a complex linkages between agents in the credit markets. 
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Chapter 3 
Access to Credit in Rural 
Vietnam: A Partial Observability 
Model 
3.1 Introduction 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, there was a considerable movement of bor- 
rowers in rural Vietnam from informal to formal sector during 1993 to 1998. The 
expansion of the formal credit sector is reported in both loan numbers and loan 
amount provided, and all sample communes are serviced by at least one formal 
credit institution. However, even when formal credit is available to people of a com- 
mune, not everybody can borrow, or at least there are people who cannot borrow as 
much as they would like to. If we assume that formal finance is more desirable and 
most people would choose formal finance as their first priority when they demand 
investment capital, then the unsuccessful applicants could be considered as riskier 
or weaker (in some aspects such as poorer or not targeted) than successful appli- 
cants. The credit rationing mechanism and selection process of formal institutions 
will push those failed applicants back to informal sources. 
This chapter aims to study the determinant factors of credit participation in 
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the formal and informal credit markets. The decision to enter the credit markets 
well depends on both supply and demand factors. In turn, demand and supply are 
simultaneously affected by a number of variables. For example, large land posses- 
sion may increase access to formal credit sector as land can be used as collateral 
for loans. But land will also affect-total demand for credit, due to the potential 
higher investment. Considering both sides of the maxket and disentangling their 
effects is essential to understand how internal and external factors would behave in 
determining a household's credit decision. 
Studies of credit markets have often been based on evaluation of borrower's 
characteristics to construct probabilistic model to estimate household's propensity 
to borrow. This approach has been applied widely in studies of developed coun- 
tries' household debt markets (see, e. g., Cox and Jappelli (1993), Leece (2000)), and 
the developing credit markets, more recently (see, e. g., Diagne (1999), Ravi (2005), 
Swain (2002)). In this chapter, we also use this type of analysis together with in- 
strumental variables to improve the identification distinction between determinants 
of supply and demand. 
Of the earlier empirical literature of rationing in rural credit markets, Kochar 
(1997) and Bell et al (1997) are the closest to this thesis. Both papers study the de- 
termination of credit rationing in the formal sector in rural areas with consideration 
of the informal credit supply. Kochar estimates the extent to which rural households 
are constrained by government regulations which control access to production credit 
from government or formal sources. Bell et al estimate the extent of rationing in the 
regulated sector and the associated spillover of demand into the unregulated mar- 
ket. Similarly to us, the authors have to deal with problem of limited information or 
partially observed data on non-borrowing households. The econometric technique 
used by Kochar and Bell et al is learnt and applied in our work with appropriate 
adjustment, especially in the identification strategy. 
Very few studies have analysed determination of credit participation by sectors in 
Vietnam. Majority are general reports from international organisations, such as the 
28 
World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, which have focused on discussion of 
data, and stylised facts of rural credit development (e. g., World Bank (1999), 'ýTorld 
Bank (2006)). Duong and Izumita (2002) examine rural household participation in 
the Vietnamese rural credit market using a small sample of 300 households collected 
by the authors. They found that the rural credit market in Vietnam is quite seg- 
mented, and that the formal sector specializes in lending for production purposes 
whereas the informal sector's lending is more diverse. Pham and Lensink (2007) 
use the VLSS data to assess lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal 
lenders for households in Vietnam. Urban households are included in their study. 
They found collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business-related activities will 
increase access to the formal sector, while household head being female increases 
the probability of participation in the informal market. 
The contribution of this chapter is to fill the gap in literature by evaluating 
determinant factors of household participation in the rural credit markets using the 
VLSS data. The features of a transition economy like Vietnam make our analysis 
particularly interesting because of the changing in economic environment and legal 
regulations over the time of the survey, i. e., the Land Law that came to effect by 
December 1993, between the two survey dates. We expect these changes in the 
economic conditions will be reflected in the changes of credit behaviour of rural 
households. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section will outline our 
definition of credit access and credit rationing used through out the thesis. Section 
3.3 presents an univariate probit model to estimate probability of participation in 
each sector of credit, assuming that all rural households have positive demand. This 
helps to focus our analysis on the determinants of supply. Section 3.4 develops 
the bivariate probit model with partial observability to disentangle the supply and 
demand forces, which jointly determine probability of credit participation. The last 
section concludes. 
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3.2 Credit Access and Credit Constraint 
Despite the frequent use of the terms "credit access" and "credit constraint" in the 
economics literature, it is not clear that these terms are always employed to refer 
to the same phenomenon. To avoid confusion, in this section we define meanings of 
these terms that we use in the thesis. 
In the last three decades, following the lead of Hall (1978), a number of suc- 
ceeding papers (e. g. Hall (1982), Hayashi (1985a, 1985b), Maki (1993) or Zeldes 
(1989)) have theoretically and empirically rejected the validity of the traditional Life 
Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis (LC-PIH) proposed by Friedman (1957) as an 
explanation of optimal consumption behaviour. The most important assumption of 
the LC-PIH is that consumer is constrained only by the lifetime budget constraint, 
so that consumption can be shielded from period-to-period fluctuation in income 
through borrowing and lending (Hayashi, 1985a). However, it has been becoming 
a consensus among economists that there exists a proportion of population facing 
credit constraints'. In other words, far from the perfect world of fully functioning 
credit markets where households are insured from transitory income shocks by bor- 
rowing, credit markets are often imperfect especially in rural parts of less developed 
countries. In the imperfect markets, there are consumers who would like to borrow 
but are refused by lenders or are not able to borrow as much as they would like to 
at the market clearing interest rate. 
In our study, the data does not allow us to identify directly households who 
practically rationed by lenders. In the credit section of both surveys, households 
were merely asked to report if they borrowed money from anyone within 12 months 
prior to the interview date. If the household interviewee answered "no", then there 
was no attempt to ask whether he had been refused by lenders or he did not borrow 
simply because of having no demand for credit. If this had been done, we would 
know directly from the surveys the level of credit constraints in the Vietnamese rural 
credit market. 
I Or, to use James Tobin's terminology, liquidity constraints. 
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Empirical models testing for the presence of credit constraints based on the 
LC-PIH has been among the most popular approaches. However, this approach is 
not feasible in our study because of the limitation of data. In general, empirical 
testing of the implications of the LC-PIH requires repeated observations on the 
same household over several time periods in order to estimate the level of household 
permanent income and its consumption behaviour. The two-period panel data from 
VLSS is short and the five years gap between the surveys will make our study 
inconclusive. 
Thus, instead of pursuing the LC-PIH approach, we will estimate the level of 
credit constraints using a bivariate probit model which allows us separately estimate 
demand for and supply of credit for each household. And households whose esti- 
mated demand for credit is not satisfied by the estimated supply will be considered 
as the credit constrained households. In this framework, the proxying permanent 
income of households are incorporated into our model by a number of observable 
variables such as household head's education, employment and landholding size. 
One good explanation for non-borrowing households is that lenders may not 
operate in the region in which the household resides, particularly in the case of 
the formal credit market. Data shows that 115 communes (out of 120) in 1992/93 
and 135 communes (out of 135) in 1997/98 have formal institutions operate in their 
areas and providing financial services to people living in that commune. It appears 
that formal credit is available in, more or less, every commune sample in 1997/98, 
implying an uniform access at commune level across Vietnamese rural regions. This 
finding, however, does not suggest the same accessibility among households in one 
or different commune. Also, one could believe that living in a particular area may 
enable household to better access to formal institutions. 
Access to credit is often confused or used interchangeably with participation in 
credit programmes in many studies. The crucial difference between the two concepts 
lies in the fact that access implies ability to borrow, i. e., availability of formal credit 
programmes and satisfying their eligibility criteria, while participation is something 
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that households choose to do freely after being able to access to formal credit. In 
other words, participation is more of a demand-side issue related to the potential 
borrower's choice of the optimal loan size while access is more of a supply-side issue 
related to the potential lender's choice of the maximum credit limit. In our study, 
a household would fall into one of four observable financing regimes as follows: 
1. Doesn't borrow 
2. Borrows from the formal sector only 
3. Borrows from the informal sector only 
4. Borrows from both credit sectors 
Households who do not borrow could either (i) have access to credit but no 
demand; or (ii) have no access to any desirable source of credit. We cannot observe 
whether a non-borrowing household falls in the former or the latter case. Therefore, 
to avoid confusing the credit accessibility (supply side) and the credit participation 
(both demand and supply), we define household credit access as the actual credit 
participant who reported a positive amount of debt at the time of the survey. 
In addition, it is noted that households who borrow from both formal and infor- 
mal markets may be a source of disturbance in study of credit markets. However, 
controlling for this potential problem is complicated, due to the difficulty of finding 
good identification for borrowers's choice between the two sectors and the signifi- 
cant computational problems. Therefore, it is common in empirical studies of credit 
markets to ignore or assume away any noise caused by two-sector borrowers. Or 
even when the two sector choice model is estimated, confidence in the results are 
relatively low (see e. g. Kochar (1997), Bell et al (1997), Conning (2001)). This 
study is not exempted. Because households borrowing from both sectors of credit 
account for less than 20 percent of total borrowers (16.27% in 1992/93 and 18.59% 
in 1997/98, see Table AA), we assume that these households do not have significant 
impact on our estimation, and they will be used as part of the, studied sample for 
both sectors. 
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3.3 Estimating Determinants of Credit Participa- 
tion by Univariate Probit Model 
This section will develop an empirical model of rural credit market outcomes con- 
sidering the joint determination of household's demand and lender's supply. The 
model concentrates on participation decisions, ignoring the information contained 
in borrowing volume which will be discussed in the next chapter. In what follow, we 
develop and estimate econometric models to understand the impacts of household 
and commune characteristics on credit participation. 
The model incorporates the following structures and assumptions: 
(i) The observed borrowing activities are jointly determined by the system of 
credit demand and supply which are, in turn, affected by household and commune 
characteristics 
(ii) Households could only borrow from either formal, or informal, but not both 
credit sectors. 
We start with a simple univariate model. We then extend our analysis to bivari- 
ate model to capture the complexity of the determinants of demand and supply. 
3.3.1 Econometric Specification 
Let D!. and Sj*j2, respectively, be latent variables of notional credit demand and 13 
credit supply of the household i in the commune j. Thus, the two variables will be 
expressed in a simplified form as 
D!. = HidjO + uij tj 
Sj*j = Hj'j-y + vij 
2 Depending on the dependent variable of the equation to be analysed, we will understand D 
and S as demand and supply of formal credit, or informal credit, or simply credit regardless of 
source. In case of not being clearly stated, we should think of D and S as a general term of demand 
and supply of credit. 
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where H', H-' are the vectors of exogenous household and commune variables which 
respectively affect the household demand for credit and the supply which lenders 
is offered to the household; 0 and -y the vector of coefficients to be estimated; and 
u and v the normal distributed errors for demand and supply of household credit 
respectively. 
Set Dij and Sij as dummy variables of demand and supply, where 
Dij =1 if D!. >0 (3.2) Z.? 
=0 if otherwise 
and 
Sij =1 if Sj*j >0 (3-3) 
=0 if otherwise 
In case of perfect or full observation, we will be able to observe values of both demand 
and supply, and therefore observe the equilibrium of borrowing. Loan amount that 
a household actually acquired is the intersection of demand and supply line i. e. 
D=S. 
However, in our study, due to insufficient information provided by the survey 
data, we observe neither D or S. Instead we observe the value of Bij, which is the 
product of D and S, the dummy variable of credit participation3 
Bij =1 if household ii is a borrower (Dij =1 and Sij = 1) (3.4) 
=0 if otherwise (Dij =0 or Sij = 0) 
That is, a household will be observed as non-borrower even if his demand for credit 
is positive (but supply equals zero). In order to interpret the estimation results 
effectively, in a similar framework, Kochar (1997) makes an assumption that all 
'Generally, we define B as household borrowing status. If we apply B by source of credit, then 
we should also interprete D and S by credit source accordingly. 
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households of the survey villages are having demand for credýt. By assuming this, 
she drives the demand function away (i. e., Dij always equals one) and hence the 
credit activities are solely determined by credit supply. However, this assumption 
appears to be strong and does not reflect the reality. Therefore, instead of following 
Kochar to make further assumption on demand and supply functions, we allow the 
model of probability of being credit participant to be estimated by a single equation 
which incorporates determinants of both demand and supply, as follows 
P (participation) = P(Bij = ljHjj) = 00 + O, Hij + cij (3.5) 
where 00 is the constant; 81 the conformable vector of coefficients to be estimated; 
Hij vector of household and commune characteristics: Hij = (Hi'j, H, 4); Cjj the 
normal distributed estimation error. 
3.3.2 Variable Selection 
This section describes various dependent and explanatory variables that are used 
in estimating the econometric model mentioned above. The following chapters in 
this thesis will also refer to this section as a reference for definition and construction 
of dependent variables. Following the discussion in Section 3.2, we construct the 
dependent variables into two categories: 
(i) CRF is dummy variable for borrowing from the formal sector. This variable cap- 
tured borrowing activities of households with lenders from the formal sector 4 
CRF takes the value one if household was borrowing from formal lenders at 
the time of the survey or within 12 months before the survey date. It equals 
zero otherwise. Settings are the same for both survey data in 1992/93 and 
1997/98. 
(ii) CRI is dummy variable for borrowing from the informal sector. Similarly to 
CRF, CRI captures borrowing activities of households with lenders from the 
4Definition and list of lenders of formal sector are in the Appendix E 
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informal sector. CRI equals one, zero otherwise, if household was borrowing 
from informal lenders at the time or within 12 months before the survey date. 
Again, settings are the same for both surveys. 
The set of explanatory variables includes three categories: 
(i) Characteristics of head of household, i. e., age, gender, marital status, education 
level, and health condition; 
(ii) Characteristics of household, i. e., household size, ratio of number of working 
adults over household size as the proxy for labour power, working in agriculture 
production, house ownership, and irrigated land holding size; 
(iii) Characteristics of the commune that household residing in, i. e., commune pop-- 
ulation, formal credit per capita, distance from commune to the nearest formal 
bank branch. 
Definition and construction of these variables can be found in the Appendix E. 
Summary statistics are in table A. 2 and table A. 3. 
Both the formal and the informal credit supply are functions of these variables 
which also determine the household demand for loans. Variables describe charac- 
teristics of household head control for the household level human capital which are 
expected to have effects on both demand and supply for credit. The variables that 
identify supply-demand functions will be discussed later. 
Married household head, a sign of household stability, is expected to have pos- 
itive impacts on credit participation for both sectors. This positive impacts could 
come from both demand and supply functions, as a family household would be in 
higher propensity to demand for credit to keep the family income stable. Lenders, 
on the other hand, may consider married households a safer borrower hence may be 
more willing to fulfill the credit demand. Gender of head may also have impacts too. 
In some areas, households with male head may demand higher credit and lenders 
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may also tend to lend to males due to requirement of heavy labour in agriculture 
production in rural regions. However, it is possible that some formal credit pro- 
grammes target female as their priority borrowers'. In that case, female household 
head may have higher participation probability in the formal sector. 
While variables of age, gender and marital status of household head become 
standard variables to include in a household regression study, the education variable 
seems to have more to deliver. The coefficient for the variable education is expected 
to have a positive sign on the formal sector participation. More educated house- 
holds may find more opportunities to invest and may be more confident to borrow. 
Also, being different from the informal sector where credit contracts axe simple and 
sometime in oral form, the formal institutions normally require more complicated 
credit application and always in paper form. Better education may help household 
understand better the application procedures, thus the formal sector is more ap- 
proachable. Similarly on the supply side, credit institutions may consider educated 
households as higher creditworthy customers and make credit better available to 
these people. The education variable of head's schooling years and schooling years 
squared are used to capture the educational level. The square form is to control for 
non-linearity of education. 
Variables capturing household size and number of working adults are expected to 
generate positive signs. Large size households consume more but at the same time, 
they may have more domestic labour if the rate of working adults in the family is 
high, and hence have more input for production expansion. The expansion may lead 
to demand for credit. The dummy variable of agricultural employment (equal one if 
working in farm) reflects possibility of self-investment and therefore is expected to 
positively influence the credit participation. 
ý In addition, facing the problem of limited information about loan applicants, 
one of the most popular solution for lenders is to require collateral. This crucial 
5There is a line of literture stylised this gender targeting and its impact on credit access (see 
(Morduch 1999) for the review). Grameen Bank is the most famous microfinance institution that 
initially established to lend to female only. 
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condition is particularly high in the formal sector. As mentioned before, 75 percent 
of formal borrowers in 1997/98 have deposited fixed assets as collateral. The number 
is even higher if borrowing from VBARD or VBP where almost 90 percent of loans 
are collateralised. Of the collateral asset, land and house account for 90 percent. 
Therefore, we incorporate the variables of irrigated land holding size and house 
ownership into our model to proxy for availability of collateral and expect their 
coefficients to be positive. 
Finally, we would like to discuss the distance variable, which measures distance 
from commune that household resides in to the nearest government bank branch. 
The distance variable is only available in VLSS1997/98 with value ranging from 
Okm (bank branch locates very closed to commune committee) to 45km. Average 
distance is 7.6km, median is 6km. 
Recent economic research have demonstrated the importance of distance in ex- 
plaining availability of formal credit. Sussman and Zeira (1995) shows that the cost 
of monitoring a borrower increase with borrower-lender distance. Consequently, if 
formal lenders are prevented from charging different prices to different borrowers 
to cover extra monitoring cost, they may choose not to lend to distant credit ap- 
plicants. Formal lenders may also face severe problem of asymmetric information 
which comes together with adverse selection and higher risk. All increase with dis- 
tance'. Following the literature, we argue that the distance hinders observability of 
formal lenders over households which eventually inflate both cost and risk of lending 
operation. As a result, formal institutions will be more cautious and less willing to 
lend to households in more distant communes. This clearly implies a shift in credit 
supply affecting household's participation. 
In addition, from the borrower's side, the further the distance to formal banks) 
the higher the cost of capital borrower has to bear. In credit rationing theory, 
uninformed lenders are likely to charge higher interest rates to remote borrowers 
in order to compensate for the risk arising from adverse selection problem. Even 
'See, for example, bell'Ariccia (2001), Degryse and Ongena (2005) for further discussion 
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in the case that interest rates are unchanged, distant borrowers will have to bear 
the cost of transportation to bank branch (may be in term of time spent - cost of 
working hour wasted). It is also possible that distant households would become less 
informed of formal credit availability, hence would not have proper demand. In sum, 
distance variable is expected to reduce formal credit participation from both supply 
and demand sides. 
The impact of distance on credit, however, may not be linear. As long as formal 
banks cannot observe borrower's locations, distance becomes indifferent (Degryse 
and Ongena, 2005). To capture this effect, we reclassify information on distance 
into three categories: DIST1[0-4kml, DIST2[>4-10kml and DIST3[>10kml'. 
Other variables, such as commune population, commune-level formal credit per 
capita, and health condition of household's key members are also included in our 
analysis. However, because these variables will be used as instrumental variables to 
identify supply and demand channels, and in order to make our argument focused, 
we will discuss these variables later in the separated section 3.4.2. Description of 
dependent and independent variables included in this chapter is in Appendix A. 
3.3.3 Estimation Results 
The univariate probit model is estimated as in equation 3.5. Despite limitations of 
this simple model, as will be discussed in the following section, results from this 
model will shed light on factors determining household's probability of participation 
to credit sectors, especially participation to the formal sector. 
Estimation of Model I is applied to both databases, VLSS1992/93 and VLSS1997/98, 
with cluster robust estimator of variance. Schooling years of household head and 
distance variables are not available in 1992/93 data. The results are reported in 
Table B. 1. Our interpretation of the results concentrates on participation in the 
formal sector. 
'Do et al (2007) use dummy of distance <5km. However, in our case, distribution of households 
in each categories would be more equal. Mean values of DIST1, DIST2, DIST3 are, respectively, 
0.39,0.38, and 0.23. 
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Results are mixed between the two surveys. In 1992/93, the coefficients corre- 
sponding to household size, ratio of working adults, health condition, land size, and 
commune credit per capita are found to significantly affect household's participa- 
tion to the formal credit sector. Most of these coefficients are also significant in 
1997/98, except health condition. In addition, in 1997/98, the coefficients for age of 
head and age squared, schooling years of head and its squared, household working in 
agriculture, and house ownership are significant on the formal sector participation 
as well. 
The coefficients for gender of head (equal one if head being male) have positive 
signs but are not significant at conventional level in both surveys, suggesting an 
indifferent effect of gender on formal borrowing. The signs of the coefficients for 
household size and ratio of working adults are positive at 1-percent significant level, 
as expected. Given the employment nature in rural Vietnam where agricultural 
production dominated, more labour available in a house is clearly an advantage 
making agriculture projects easier to form and implement. Without hiring extra 
labour, a small family may not have motivation and capacity to expand the family 
business, reducing demand for credit. Moreover, formal institutions may also be 
more willing to lend to large household size, with its potential of higher labour 
input. All these affect the formal sector participation. 
The first difference between the 1992/93 and 1997/98 results is the signification 
of the coefficients for irrigated land holding size. In 1992/93, land size positively 
and significantly increase formal sector participation. This could be a result of 
better access to formal lenders due to availability of collateral assets, but it could 
also simultaneously stem from high demand for investment capital. Although the 
coefficient on this variable is still positive in 1997/98, it becomes less significant 
(10% level). Households with larger land holding may no longer have higher access 
to credit institutions. Again, it may be because of changes (tightening) in collateral 
policy which squeezes formal credit supply. 
As regards to the use of fixed asset as collateral in less developed countries, 
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De Soto (2000) argues that one of the key reasons why poor people are excluded 
from main stream finance and then left out of economic development is that poor 
countries often lack of the legal entitlement to private property. As a result, without 
legal entitlement, assets such as land and houses that poor people may possess are 
difficult to trade, or more importantly, cannot be used as collateral for initial loan 
they demand. In such circumstance, value of property become less important as 
presented in table A. 2. House value and house area of borrowing household are 
even smaller than that of all sample mean value. Unfortunately, we do not have 
data on land and house legal ownership certificate of sample households, we could 
not conclude on how the impact of legal entitlement on borrowers. However, in a 
study by Quy-Tban Do that uses land right registration number in different survey 
concludes that legal protection of private property indeed open many doors for 
rural households including accessibility to formal credit sector. Of the incentive 
and demand for investment credit, borrowers do seem to possess larger agricultural 
land size than mean of all sample. However, the single credit equation estimation 
does not allow us to clarify whether the less important role of land possession in 
determining formal credit access stemming from reduction in supply or demand. 
Purther discussion, therefore, will be presented in the next section. 
The second discrepancy is the significant level of the coefficients for health condi- 
tion which are again positive and significant at 1-percent in the 1992/93 regression, 
but insignificant in the 1997/98 regression. As discussed previously, the higher value 
of the health variable reflects the worse health condition of the household members, 
and possibly higher demand for consumption credit. Positive sign of the coefficient 
means that households in 1992/93 seems to borrow more often from the formal sec- 
tor if health condition of the household is not good. Although this result may sound 
peculiar, it does conform to what we have observed from the data. In 1992/93, 
almost 30 percent of all formal loans is for consumption purposes, which including 
loans to pay for health service expenses. Credit cooperatives, private banks and 
other formal credit institutions even provide more than 50 percent of their loans 
for consumption (see Table A. 12). Together with the low collateral requirement of 
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the formal institutions 8, the formal sector in 1992/93 seems to be approachable by 
households if they had consumption or urgent cash demand. This explains why bad 
health conditions lead to higher formal borrowing in 1992/93, although the mar- 
ginal effect is small'. The situation in 1997/98 is different. Formal institutions now 
mostly provide credit for investment purposes'O and request collateral for their loans 
more frequently, which means borrowing for consumption becomes less popular and 
takes more time to process (e. g. more paper works related to collateral asset), even 
if possible. Indeed, bad health condition households may well find it more difficult 
to obtain consumption loans from the formal sector in 1997/98. 
Other variables which significantly affect borrowing probability from the formal 
sector in 1997/98 are age, education, employment in agriculture, house ownership, 
and commune-level credit per capita. The coefficient of age squared in the regression 
is significant and negative which implies an inverse u-shape impact of age on formal 
borrowing activities. The result suggests that households having head at the age 
of 48 axe most likely to obtain formal loan". Above that turning point, the older 
the household head, the lower the credit activity. This reflects that older people 
seems to be more settled, less productive, and are less likely to take new investment 
initiatives. Demand may play a more important role than supply here. 
Similarly, to account for the non-linear effect of education, squared value of 
schooling years is included in the regression which also obtains negative and signifi- 
cant coefficient. This result casts an interesting implication. Unlike the conventional 
wisdom that higher education gives household better access and then higher proba- 
bility of participation to the formal sector, in rural Vietnam, household heads with 
seven years in school or secondary school education appear to borrow more frequent 
8 The percentages of collateralised loans by credit cooperatives, private banks and other formal 
credit institutions are 17%, 5% and 8% in 1993, and 75%, 79% and 20% in 1997/98 respectively. 
See table A. 2 and table A. 10 for details. 
gThe marginal effect equals 0.0031 
10 Only 17 percent of all formal loans is for consumption, which is mainly from credit cooperatives. 
"Holding all other variables fixed, the relationship between the dependent variable probability of 
formal credit sector participation Pr (B) and the variables age and age_ 2 can be expressed in the 
function: 
* 
Pr(Bij) = O, Ageij + 02Age_2ij + vij. This parabol function will achieve its maximum 
value of Pr(Bij) at Age =0 22 where the first derivative of Pr(Bij) with respect to Age equals -it 
zero. 
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than household heads with college or university education, or households with very 
low or no education at all. A possible explanation is that it is easier for people 
with high education to find a paid job. These people may choose not to work in 
farm or small self-business, therefore even if they have better access to the formal 
sector, their low demand for investment credit decreases the borrowing rate. Or 
simply, people with higher education may be more likely wealthier, or at least less 
poor than low education people, hence demand for credit is not expected to linearly 
increased with education level. On the opposite direction, household heads having 
no or little education may find themselves excluded from the formal credit services. 
This phenomenon, however, has been discussed widely in the literature (see, e. g., 
Aghion (2005), Harper (1998)). We will come back to this latter when estimations 
of supply and demand equations are separately done. 
Employment in agricultural production also increases borrowing from formal 
sources in 1997/98 while this coefficient in 1992/93 is positive but insignificant. 
This result may reflect the impacts of economic development, the decollectivisation 
of agricultural production, and the major change in the new land regulation enforced 
in late 1993, which eventually created better economic infrastructure and incentives 
for rural households to invest to increase productivity and production expansion. It 
also emerges from Table BA that house ownership and commune credit per capita 
are positive and statistically significant determinants of formal credit participation, 
as expected. There are many reasons for expecting these variables to be positive, 
in which limited information of potential borrowers and requirement of collateral 
assets play the central roles curbing the formal credit supply. 
Dealing with the variables, which are not statistically significant in this speci- 
fication, it is important to keep in mind that allowing demand and supply forces 
estimated simultaneously in a single equation may blur the picture of rural credit 
participation. It is likely that some variables drive credit demand and supply func- 
tions differently having a hidden impacts on paxticipation. Take the distance vari- 
ables as an example. As shown in Table B. 1, living closed to formal bank branch 
will significantly increase propensity of formal borrowing. When distance increases, 
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the positive effect also disappears. We, however, are not able to tell whether this 
disappearance of significance comes from which sides of the market. 
We now turn to the estimated probability of participation in the informal credit 
sector, which can also be found in Table B. 1. Generally, there are fewer number of 
significant coefficients in both data sets. Household size positively and significantly 
increases informal borrowing, as expected. The coefficient for commune credit per 
capita shows a negative sign in 1997/98 data, which suggests that the formal sector 
expansion over the time between the two surveys has become a real and accessible 
source of credit for rural households. It is also a signal of the crowding out impact 
of the formal sector competition on informal lenders12. The more availability of 
formal credit in a commune, the less likely households in that commune will borrow 
from informal sources. The more interesting results are on the health variables. 
Both regressions reveal that bad health condition of household members will push 
households to borrow more often from informal lenders, reassuring our hypothesis 
on informal credit demand in condition of negative income shock. 
Until now, we have assumed that the participation decision to formal and infor- 
mal credit sectors are independent and having no interaction. However, they may be 
related, especially when households have access to both credit sectors. To address 
this problem, we estimate a bivariate probit regression where errors from estimates 
of formal and informal credit sector participation are allowed to be correlated. Thus, 
similar to Model I specification, the sector participation equations are expressed as: 
1 if B?! =, 8, Hi'j + cl. > 0,0 otherwise 23 13 
where B! is the dummy variable of household participation in credit sector ii 
s, s= (formal, informal). All other variable specifications are as before, except 
the error terms el. assumed to be distributed as a bivariate normal, i. i. d. across 13 
observations, with the correlation coefficient p to be estimated. 
12See Jain (1999) for theoretical discussion of the crowding-out phenomenon in the rural credit 
market in developing countries. 
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The Wald test for the null hypothesis of p=0, however, cannot be rejected p 93 
0.8871, Px982 = 0.6583) suggesting that the equations of credit sector participation 
could be independently estimated. Therefore, the results yielded from the bivariate 
model are almost the same to the results from the univariate model that we discussed 
before. For completeness, results of the bivariate probit regression are presented in 
Table B. 2. 
In summary, the results from Model I are fairly consistent over the two surveys, 
signs of coefficients mostly as expected. The differences in significant level of some 
coefficients between estimates from VLSS1992/93 and VLSS1997/98, e. g. irrigated 
land holding size, health condition, farm, and house ownership, imply the change 
of economic environment and the development of rural credit market. Moreover, 
the results suggest that a key underlying distinction between the formal and the 
informal credit sector participations is that the formal sector participation is partic- 
ularly driven by observable variables, such as physical asset, e. g. house ownership, 
or human capital, e. g. education of head, number of working adults in the house- 
hold. These variables reflect household demand for investment capital as well as its 
accessibility to the formal sector. The important roles of information variables like 
credit per capita, and distance are also highlighted. In contrast, the informal sector 
participation is significantly affected by household size and health condition. 
Finally, we predict the probabilities of participation to credit sectors based on 
the estimated model. The results reveal a dramatic change of credit market over the 
five years gap between the two surveys. In 1993, only about 21% of households in 
rural area is predicted to borrow from the formal sector, implying that the remaining 
79% is rationed out. This number is almost less than a half of the predicted 40% of 
the informal sector participation. However, in 1998, coinciding with the expansion 
of the formal sector, the predicted formal sector participation increases to 37%. 
This reflects a better accessibility to formal credit by 1997/98. The validity of these 
estimates, as well as the consistency of the Model I, however, is conditional on the 
validity of the assumption that credit participation is solely determined by a single 
credit supply function. We address this problem in the bivariate probit model below. 
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3.4 Bivariate Probit Model with Partial Observ- 
ability 
3.4.1 Econometric Specification 
A possible reason for the popularity of this univariate probit model is its simplicity 
to implement and conformable results to theoretical predictions (see, for example, 
Iqbal (1981), Swain (2002)). However, the moýel suffers from substantial drawback 
due to its unrealistic assumptions on the single credit equation which incorporates 
both demand and supply forces. In practice, there will be a good proportion of 
non-borrowing households who have either no demand for or no supply of credit. 
There are several reasons. One will not borrow if one has been saving enough to 
self-finance the arise project. Conversely one does not borrow because he has no 
sufficiently profitable projects to invest or simply he is lacking of necessary skills 
to manage the potential investment and voluntarily withdraw himself from credit 
market. If a policy recommendation can be drawn from these observations, it may 
be that making credit available to poor households, as many countries did in 1970s 
by government credit subsidy, will not always work. Rather than that many poor 
households, especially those from the poorest segments, may be better off with 
government assistance in health, education and infrastructure (e. g. clean water, 
electricity, concrete road). These supports would help them to increase physical 
productivity and human capital, which empower them to new investment latter in 
time. 
In order to relax the initial assumption and to address the problem of non- 
separable credit demand and supply, we employ the model of partial observability. 
This model is first introduced by Poirier (1980), and developed and applied in various 
empirical studies. Several possible bivariate probit models are available" depending 
on level of observability of dependent variables in which Poirier's case is the least 
information one. In other studies (see e. g. Abowd (1982), Feinstein (1989), and 
11 Meng & Schmidt (1985) provides a very good review on related literatures. 
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Heywood (1995)) at least one of the two dependent variable is observable and the 
model becomes a sequential decision model where the first step is known. For 
example, Abowd (1982) apply the partial observability model to examine job queues 
and union status which relax the assumption of other studies in the same topic that 
all workers who wish to work on union jobs are always able to find one14 . 
Yet, union 
status is only observed if one has desire to join the union and be selected. Otherwise, 
we do not know a whether a non-union status person does not want to join the union 
or had been refused to join. The model that Abowd-Farber employed is in the same 
sense as the model introduced by Poirier, however there is a difference between the 
two. In Abowd-Farber study, more information has been observed which is the 
desire of non-union workers to join union. In other words, demand is observed for 
all samples and union status therefore is determined by selection function. In this 
case, one observes more than in Poirier's model but less than in the full observability 
case 15 . 
z In our study, observation of borrowing activities falls into the Poirier's type due 
to non-observability of both credit demand and supply. Yet we do not observe credit 
demand of households in the sample, hence it is not possible to separate whether a 
non-borrowing household is one that applied for credit but was rejected by lenders or 
simply having no credit demand. Following the structure specified in equations 3.1, 
3.2,3.3, and 3.4, credit participation status (B = 1) is only observed when there exist 
both demand and supply (S =1&D= 1). The last three combinations of S. and D. 
(S =0 and D=0; or S=0 and D=1; or S=1 and D 0) are indistinguishable 
since we only learn that there is no credit activity (i. e. B 0). According to Poirier 
(1980), the probability distribution of B is driven by a bivariate process representing 
binary choice of credit demander and supplier concerning the level of observability of 
"See, for example, Lee (1978), Schmidt (1976) 
'5It is called censored probit model or partial partial observability model by 
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D and S 
Pr(Bij = 1) = Pr(Dij = 1, Sij = 1) (3.6) 
Pr(Di*j > 0, Si*j > 0) (3.7) 
Pr(Hidjß + uij > 0, Hi$jß + vij > 0) 
d 
= Pr(-Hi'jP < uij, - H,? 3. -y < vij) 
=1- F(-HidjO, - Hi'jy) 
= F(Hidj, 8, Hi'j-y, p) 
and 
Pr(Bij = 0) = Pr(Dij =0 or Sij = 0) (3.8) 
1-Pr(Dij=I&Sij=l) (3.9) 
1-F (Hi'j, 8, Hi'j -y, p) (3.10) 
We then obtain the log likelihood function 16 of the sample as 
n 
Log L(, 8,7; p) Bij ln(F(Hjdjý, Hi'j-y; p)) + (1 - Bij) In(l - F(HidjO, Hi'j-y; p)) 
(3.11) 
where p is the correlation between uij and vij; F(. ) denotes the bivariate standard 
normal distribution. 17 
The consequences of partial observability, as stated by Poirier himself, is that 
estimate of the model comes with cost i. e. the loss of efficiency. Poirier (1980, p. 212) 
notes that "estimators obtained from the model will be inefficient compared to those 
obtained in the case of fully observed choices". This efficient lost is measured in a 
study by Meng & Schimidt (1985). Although there is no general conclusion on how 
"The difference between full and partial observability likelihood function is in its information 
matrix where the former has four observable outcomes of S and D, and the latter has only two. 
17The likelihood function for model with full observed information is originated from Maddala 
1983, p. 123. 
48 
much efficiency has been foregone between full and partial observability, Meng & 
Schmidt do show that the loss does exist and there is evidence of efficiency improve- 
ment in moving from partial to censored and to full observability. The efficiency loss 
depends on the fraction data of the unobserved dependent variable in the dataset 
and the strength of identification especially near points of non-identification. In 
other word, sample split matters and the higher rate of observed "yes, yes" depen- 
dent variable the more efficiency we obtain. However, Meng & Schimidt concludes 
that as long as the model is identified we should not worry too much on how strong 
its identifying power is 18 . 
3.4.2 Identification Strategy 
While there is little we could do to improve the efficiency of model estimation due 
to limitation of available data, we can examine its identification. Under the general 
principle Rothenberg (1971), and as details in Poirier (1980), the partial observed 
bivariate probit models will be (locally) identified if and only if the information 
matrix corresponding to 3.11. is non-singular. In other word, 'for the model to be 
identified, we need at least one variable that is included in the explanatory variable 
sets of demand or supply equation (either Hý or M), but not in both. Indeed, 
finding valid identification is a crucial task in our study. 
The identification variable sometimes simply stems from the method of sampling 
involved or from exogenous facts affecting one of the two equations. For example, 
Pitt and Khandker (1998) use the exogenous eligibility condition that only house- 
holds own less than 0.5 acres of land are able to join any of the formal credit pro- 
grammes in the area. This exogenous rule clearly defines the formal credit supply 
function, and hence identifies the model. 
As already discussed in the previous section, most of variables capturing house- 
"To find the effect of identification, Meng & Schimidt (1985) hold sample split and other features 
constant while increasing identification power. Generally, the cost of efficiency falls as identification 
power increases but the effect is only strong and predictable while near the point of nonidentification 
(P. 80) 
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hold and commune characteristics will appear in both equations. The variables 
that are observable by econometrician will be reasonably expected to be observed 
by lenders, especially informal lenders. Therefore, it is exceptionally difficult to 
find "perfect" or "clean" instrumental variables, even in economic experiment. For 
instance, in the example by Pitt and Khandke cited above, in theory no house- 
hold possessing larger than 0.5 acresý of land should be found to borrow from formal 
lenders. But in reality, as pointed out by Morduch (1998, p. 4), as many as 30 percent 
of formal borrowers actually own more than 0.5 acres. In another example, although 
principle interest rates of formal credit institutions could be a good instrument -for 
predicting the demand for credit, the lack of variations in interest rates precludes 
such use. 
One crucial argument we use in this dissertation to identify the demand for 
formal credit is that not all household characteristics can be observed by formal 
lenders due to limited information and lending policy. Therefore, the formal credit 
demand is primarily identified by a proxy variable measuring the health condition 
of the two most important persons in the household which is the number of illness 
days of household head and his/her spouse within four weeks before the time of 
the survey. This health proxy variable is assumed to reflect health condition of the 
family and hence the domestic labour supply. That is, the higher number of days 
of illness, the poorer health condition of family heads and the less labour input for 
production. As already pointed out, a great portion of formal loans is for investment 
(80 percent of all formal loans in 1998) and, in reality, formal loan applicants are 
often asked to submit their business plan explaining how to use the credit as a part of 
the application procedure (Pham & Izurnida, 2002). In addition, due to its relatively 
large loan size, low interest rate with slow credit disbursement, the formal sector can 
be considered as the primary source for investment capital. Bad health problem and 
shortage of labour supply will"consequently limit household's production expansion 
and therefore reduce household's demand for formal investment credit. However, 
this variable is not normally observable by institutions, hence it has no effect on 
supply decision and is excluded from the formal supply equation S. Because not- 
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healthy households are likely to voluntarily withdraw from the formal credit market, 
if there exists a negative relationship between the health variable and the formal 
credit participation, it is probably the result of little credit demand rather than of 
supply rationing. 
More difficult, however, is the identification of the informal credit demand. Dif- 
ferent from formal lenders, informal lenders, mostly friends and relatives, are able 
to closely observe household characteristics and local community environment. In 
other words, variables that influence credit demand will also be detected by informal 
lenders before making their own decision on supply. For instance, the bad health 
condition of household heads could increase demand for consumption credit, espe- 
cially in urgent need of emergency cash. Riends and relatives are understandable to 
be the first option but they can also be well informed of the household situation and 
may not be willing to lend. As argued by Udry (1994), one should not expect to be 
able to find exclusion restrictions to identify the informal credit demand function. 
And we are not exempted. Therefore, to estimate determinants of informal sector 
participation, we has to solely rely on the identification from the informal supply 
equation which will be discussed below. 
Identification of the formal sector supply is achieved by the variable measuring 
commune-level formal credit per capita, which equals total formal loan amount 
for all purposes lent to households in commune divides to commune's population. 
The use of this variable as instrument for formal credit supply is based on the 
extensive literature on credit rationing due to lending cost, adverse selection, and the 
importance of availability of borrower's information to formal lenders. The higher 
credit per capita a commune has, the more activities formal institutions undertake 
in the region. With more information and understanding about local environment, 
no doubt, formal institutions will be more confident to lend. Access to formal sector 
therefore will be higher for households residing in a commune that is better known 
by organised lenders than households from a commune where banks have little or 
no credit activity history. 
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A final issue which needs to be addressed is identification of the supply of in- 
formal loans. As widely discussed in literature on rural credit access, it is hard to 
define identification of informal supply without some relatively strong assumption 
on its availability according to the dynamic and the non-formality of lending condi- 
tions (see e. g. Aleern (1990), Bell (1997), Gine(2005), Conning (2001), and Kochar 
(1997)). For example, Kochar (1997) employs an indicator variable of "personal 
surety", a third party guarantee to secure the informal contract as the proxy for 
availability of informal credit supply. However, she also points out that the esti- 
mation basing on this variable is likely to yield biased results due to endogenous 
determination of informal borrowing. She then proposes a model to estimate prob- 
ability of households having a security using joint distribution of the probability of 
being an informal borrower and of being the borrower providing some form of per- 
sonal guarantee. This model, as she accepts, has a complicated structure without 
knowing the exact form of the joint distribution to be estimated. In our case, only 
about 20 percent of informal borrowers in 1997/98 needs some kind of guaxantee for 
their loans19 which implies that the security variable as used by Kochar (1997) is 
not a promising identificator. 
Originating from a widely observed facts that informal lenders are usually in- 
dividuals living relatively close to borrowers (see e. g. Harper (1998)), normally in 
the same village or commune, we employ the variable of commune population as 
identification of availability of the informal credit. Indeed, as we have discussed in 
the earlier section that most of informal lenders in rural Vietnam are relatives and 
friends (about 80 percent of all informal loans in both surveys), higher population 
of a commune will increase number of potential informal lenders. This variable is 
assumed to be independent with household demand for the informal credit, hence 
serve to distinguish the supply from the demand equations of the informal credit 
market. 
"In Kochar (1997) study, 52 percent of informal loans requires third party security 
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3.4.3 Estimation Results 
The model of bivariate probit with partial observability (Model II) generalises Model 
I by relaxing the assumption of the singly determined equation of credit partici- 
pation. The probability of credit sector participation is now jointly determined by 
household demand for credit and lender's decision on access. Estimates of the Model 
II are reported in Table B. 3, BA and B. 5. 
We start by testing Model II against Model I to verify that allowing demand and 
supply equations to be estimated separately is necessary to strengthen the results. 
Because the models are non-nested, we cannot employ the conventional tests using 
the Likelihood ratio in selecting between the two. Instead, we apply the Akaike's 
information criterion (AIC) tests for the best-fit of each model estimation. The AIC 
critical values penalise the log-likelihood values for the addition of parameters, and 
thus select a model that fits well but has a minimum number of parameters ". The 
results 21 do support the selection of Model II over Model I. 
In 1992/93, the coefficients for household size, ratio of working adult in the house- 
hold, irrigated land holding size, and health condition are found to positively and 
significantly affect demand for formal credit, which is as expected and consistent 
with results from Model I. On the supply side, the coefficients for household size 
and commune credit per capita, the instrument for supply equation, are positive 
and statistically significant. The latter variable confirms the important role of local 
information and regional market familiarity for formal institutions in determining 
credit supply. However, the negative influence of head's education and land holding 
size on supply is somewhat surprising. This may indicate that formal institutions 
in 1992/93 do not consider household head's education as an important criteria for 
their decision on access. Also, the underdevelopment of legal regulation on private 
land title may hinder the possibility of using land as collateral asset. Banks there- 
fore may consider land quality or agriculture productivity rather than household's 
2'Discussion of using AIC and its derivations is provided in Koehler(1988). Stata command 
icomp is employed to calculate the test. 
2111eported in the results Tables B. 3, BA and B. 5. 
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land size as important factors determining the supply. 
Turning to the VLSS1997/98 estimates, most of the parameters have the ex- 
pected signs and significance level at 5% or better. On the demand equation, house- 
hold size, number of working adults in the household and working in farm continue 
to highly associate with demand for formal credit, affirming the vital role of do- 
mestic labour input in agriculture production. The coefficients for age of household 
head is negative and significant as in the previous model. The signs of schooling 
years of household head and its squared value again imply an inverse u-shape effect 
on formal credit demand, which is shown to be the main mechanism to drive the 
result of formal sector participation in Model I. 
The supply equation reveals that the sets of variables used by formal institutions 
in making their supply decisions differ considerably from those shaping the house- 
hold's demand for credit. Thus, access to the formal sector is primarily determined 
by regional measures, i. e., commune-level credit per capita, and distance to bank 
branch. Indeed, households residing in a distant commune are likely to be neglected 
by formal credit institutions. 
Estimates of the Model II for the informal sector participation axe applied on 
both data sets, however the global convergence only obtained for VLSS1997/98 
data. This is not uncommon in the literature, as noted in Abowd & Farber (1982), 
Meng & Schmidt (1985), and theoretically discussed in Maddala (1983). Instead 
of presenting results at local convergence" for VLSS1992/93 data, which appears 
not to give us a consistent estimate of the true parameter value, we concentrate on 
discussing the 1997/98 results, presented inTable B. 5. 
Basing on estimates of access to formal sector, we use the predicted probability of 
having access to formal credit as an extra identificator for the informal demand. We 
expect that higher level of accessibility to the formal sector would reduce demand 
for informal loans. 
As expected and relatively consistent with the results in Model I, the variables 
22Correlation between the residuals of demand and supply equation is either +1 or -1 
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associated with high consu; nption need, i. e. household size and health condition, 
positively affect informal credit demand. However, with supply equation separately 
estimated, we understand further that the positive effect of number of adults in 
the household on informal borrowing is driven by the better supply rather than 
by the higher demand. This reflects the importance of social connection for the 
informal sector accessibility. Also, the coefficient for availability of informal lenders, 
proxied by commune population, is found to be positive and significant in the supply 
equation. The coefficient on the predicted value of formal accessibility is negative 
and significant at 1% level, suggesting that households possibly prefer to borrow 
from formal lenders if they have access to both credit sectors. 
Finally, we predict average probability of household having demand and access 
to each credit sectors based on the estimates from Model II. The probabilities of 
participation to the formal sector, i. e. (Pr (Sf = 11 Df = 1)), in 1992/93 and 1997/98, 
are 52.61% and 72.30%, respectively. These results are significantly higher than 
predicted values in the Model 1 (20.67% and 37.10%, respectively). Clearly, by 
estimating demand and supply equations independently, Model II provides more 
insides. First, the percentage of households having demand for formal credit (Df = 
1) is estimated at 39.63% in 1992/93 and 51.13% in 1997/98. The probabilities of 
having access to a formal source (Sf = 1) are, respectively, 76.00% and 86.02%. 
With regards to the informal credit sector participation, the Model II shows that 
almost 90% of rural households in 1997/98 has access to some source of informal 
credit (e. g. neighbours, friends, relatives or money lenders). Model I once again 
predicts a lower number at 27.91%. 
The results imply that based on Model I solely will induce misleading conclusion 
on prediction of credit rationing. According to the Model 1, neaxly 80% of households 
in 1992/93 and 63% in 1997/98 having no access to formal credit. However, as the 
Model H reveals, the supply of formal credit in both years is adequately large, which 
significantly drives credit rationing rates down to 47% and 28%, respectively. The 
low rate of participation in 1992/93 appears to originated from the low demand 
rather than the short supply. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter uses probability models to estimate the determinants factors of credit 
accessibility of Vietnamese rural households, with concentration on access to the for- 
mal sector. Unlike previous studies on Vietnam's rural credit markets (e. g., Pham et 
al (2002)), we aims to estimate the demand and the supply channels sepaxately. The 
demand for formal credit is identified by variable capturing health status of house- 
hold members. The formal supply is identified by commune-level formal credit per 
capita, which reflects operation of formal lenders in the studied communes. We bases 
our analysis on the bivariate probit model with partial observability. This model 
is employed to address the problem of limited information on the non-borrowing 
households. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of Vietnamese 
rural credit markets that allows supply of and demand for credit to be estimated 
distinctly. 
Estimation results present evidence of the impacts of economic development on 
credit behaviour of rural households. The role of household characteristics deter- 
mining level of access to the formal sector is differed over the years between the two 
surveys, implying the changes of economic environment. The distinction between 
the demand for formal and informal credit arises from the observable variables, such 
as physical asset, e. g. house ownership, or human capital, e. g. education of head, 
number of working adults in the household, reflecting household demand for invest- 
ment capital. The supply of formal credit depends significantly on informational 
variables like credit per capita, and distance. Prediction of formal credit market 
participation is high and increases over years, implying the expansion of the formal 
sector. The demand for formal credit is also inflated, suggesting household's need 
for investment capital grows with economic development. 
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Chapter 4 
The Determinants of Credit 
Amount Obtained by Rural 
Households in Vietnam 
4.1 Introduction 
Thus far, the focus has been on the determinant factors of overall probability of 
credit market participation of rural households. In what follows, the focus will be 
on the determinant factors of the amount of credit obtained. The VLSSs provide 
data on every separate loans that a household held in the reference years including 
loans with different lenders and different loans with the same lender. Hence the 
amount of loan that a household received from the same source of credit could be 
derived. Assuming that a lender's decisions on supply of different loans to the same 
household are homogenous, then household characteristics will be judged identically 
on every loan application and sum of loan amounts obtained from the same lender 
could be considered as one loan amount. Therefore, the unit of observation here 
is a loan amount obtained from each source of credit. Every household will only 
appear once in the dataset whether it does not borrow, or borrow only one loan 
from one source, or borrow more than one loan from more than one source of credit. 
57 
Depending on source of credit, a household may appear as non-formal borrower even 
though it does take credit from formal source, and vice versa. Until now, all types 
of lenders from the same sector are considered as homogenous and hence they will 
act in the same way in considering characteristics of credit applicants. 
The reason for studying the determinants of loan amount obtained is the fact 
that not every household could be able to borrow as much as they want to or in other 
words there is a high possibility of quantitative credit rationing (Petrick, 2005). In 
the previous chapter, the analysis has been on credit participation of households 
which is referring to complete rationing where some households could not borrow 
even the smallest loan amount. Those models do not aim to and also are not able 
to explain what factor causing the differences in loan size that households had. The 
variation of average loan size by lenders'can be found in table A. 9 and A. 10. For both 
reference years, loans from government banks and relatives are respectively larger 
than the average size of those from the formal and the informal sector. Also, the 
loan size has actually increased more than three times for the 5 years gap between 
the two surveys. These increases, however, are not likely equally distributed among 
borrowers. Hence, the following analysis contributes to build up a bigger picture of 
relationship between lenders and borrowers in rural credit market. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides econometric 
framework for estimation, followed by the section on identification strategy. Results 
are discussed in the sequent section. Conclusion is the last. 
4.2 Econometric Framework 
The empirical model is as follows. Let Lij be observed value of the dependent 
variable, the loan amount that household i in the- commune j receives by the time 
of the survey, which is sum of all loans from the same source of credit. One will 
only observe that Lij >0 if household is a borrower and Lij =0 if not. The loan 
amount Lij is determined by households and regional characteristics which can be 
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expressed as 
Lij = L!. = Hijo + cij if Hij, 8 + cij 13 
=0 otherwise (4.2) 
where L!. is the latent dependent variable of loan amount, Hij is the vector of 13 
household and regional characteristics, 0 the vector of coefficients to be estimated 
and cij the residual, assumed to be normally and independently distributed. 
The censoring feature of Lij destroys the assumption of linear relationship be- 
tween the loan amount obtained and household characteristics. Hence estimation 
of the model following the conventional linear original least square regression will 
result in bias. In economics, this type of censored model is called the model of lim- 
ited dependent variable or the Tobit model, which first introduced by the pioneering 
work of Tobin (1958)1. Following the literature, the model considered in equation 
(4.1) can be consistently estimated by maximizing its likelihood function2. 
However, it has been argued that the standard Tobit model faces limitations. As 
noted by Cragg (1971), among others (see, for example, Gronau (1973), Heckman 
(1976), Fin & Schimidt (1984), and Blundell & Meghir (1987)), the standard Tobit 
specification is quite restrictive because it imposes that both participation decision 
and decision concerning the size of the dependent variable depend on the same fac- 
tors and the same mechanism. In other words, the Tobit model assumes that the 
probability of the observations being censored and the value of continuous observa- 
tions on the dependent variable are governed by the same stochastic process. Thus, 
'The Tobit model has become popularly applied in various areas of empirical economics, es- 
pecially recently due to the advance of computational capacity and the increased availability of 
microdata. An excellent literature review of theoretical development and empirical application of 
the Tobit model and its generations is provided in Amamiya (1984). . 
2The standard likelihood function for the Tobit model is: L= Bl-cfiijfl1a)]IIC-1O[(Ljj- 
01 
HijO)Ial where Iland 11 refer to product of the likelihood over zero and positive observations of 
01 Lij, 4) and 0 refer to the standard normal distribution and density function, respectively. 
59 
any variable that increases the probability of a non-zero value must also increase the 
conditional mean of the positive value. Therefore, in the case that the zero value 
of dependent variable is generated through a different process i. e. self-selection or 
selection on unobservable characteristics, the estimate of equation (4.1) may be po- 
tentially biased. For example, some households may be less likely to borrow due to 
their low demand, but once they decide to borrow, these households may borrow 
more than others. 
By incorporating the participation process, the model is then rewritten with an 
additional selection equation, as 
H? ý-y + uij (4.3) 
and 
Lij = V. = Hýfl + cij if R: ý >0 (4.4) 23 
=0 if otherwise 
where Rý is the latent variable capturing the selection process, HP and HL the ii 
vectors of characteristics, -y and 6 the coefficients to be estimated, and uij and Cij 
the error terms for the equations (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. (uij, cij) is assumed to 
be independent of HP and HL, and normally distributed. The correlation coefficient 
between uij and cij is p,,,. 
Given the above structure, there are two distinguished cases regarding the as- 
sumption on distribution of error terms. First, if the errors are independent i. e. 
pue =0 then the selection -process do not have effect on the outcome equation, or in 
other words, there is no sample selection problem. In this case, the model becomes 
a two-part model which was presented in detail by Cragg (1971) and applied by, for 
example, Duan et al (1983) in a study of individual annual medical expenses. This 
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model can be estimated in two-step procedure, using probit regression to obtain 
consistent estimates of -y for the participation equation and then carrying out OLS 
regression for the outcome on the selected sample to get consistent estimates for 
(Wooldridge, 2002, p. 563). 
However, any correlation between the two errors, i. e. p., ýA 0, will require an al- 
ternative estimation procedure to address potential bias. In other words, we need to 
take account of the sample selection problem and the different mechanism of partic- 
ipation and outcome'. This selection model can be estimated'straightforward using 
MLE method, as long as (uij, cij) are bivariate normal distributed'. Alternatively, 
Heckman (1979) suggests a two-step procedure, which is less efficient compared to 
MLE but consistent and simple to implement. In the first step, the probit selection 
equation is estimated by MLE and sample selection correction term is constructed. 
For each observation in the selected sample, we compute 3ij (the inverse 
kjAij 71 
Mills ratio). In the second step, the outcome equation (4.4) is then estimated by 
OLS, including the correction term Aij as an additional regressor, as below 
E (L ij I HjLj, Pi*j > 0) = Hi'j 0+a,, p., ý ij (4.5) 
4.3 Model Identification 
Selection in the standard Tobit model specified in equation (4.1) does not require 
any condition in order to be identified. In theory, the bivariate selection model 
is also identified without restrictions on the regressors. Even if exactly the same 
regressors appear in the equation (4.3) and (4.4), i. e. HP = HL' the model still 
formally identified due to the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio. However, this 
3 (Amamiya 1984) calls the model a type 2 Tobit model, (Wooldridge 2002) calls it a probit 
selection model. Here, in our particular situtation, we prefer to call it the selection model. 
4The likelihood function of the model is L= IIP(Pi*j :5 O)jjf(LjjjHjj, Pj*j > O)P(Pi*j > 
01 
0). The where assumptions on the error terms are (uij, cij)-N(O, 0,2, U2,2 aU' pue) and au 
1. Derivation and exact form of the likelihood function provided in (Amemiya 1985, p-386) 
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case (HP = HL) often leads to'multicollinearity problem between the inverse Mills 
L included in outcome equation, as discussed in ratio term A and the regressors H 
many research (see, for example, Nawata & Nagase (1996), Leung & Yu (1996)). 
Therefore, as a rule of thumb in empirical study, estimation of the selection model 
requires at least one regressor in the participation equation (P*) be excluded from 
the outcome equation (L*). In other words, HL should be a subset of HP. Hence the 
centre point in estimating the selection model is to identify the participation and 
outcome equations. 
Recalling discussion from the previous Chapter 3, a household is observed to 
participate in credit market if and only if he has demand for loan and that demand 
is satisfied (either fully or partly) by lender's supply. In other words, P* >0 if and 
only if (D* >0& S* > 0). However, as also noted, demand and supply channels 
are not observed in the data. We therefore have to estimate these equations using 
instrumental variables which are argued to affect either demand or supply but not 
both functions. That is, in addition to household and commune characteristics that 
generally included, health condition of household members is used to identify the 
demand, while commune credit per capita, and commune population are instruments 
for the supply5. 
The picture is, however, more blurred in estimating the selection model, to find 
determinants of credit amount. As discussed, the loan value is only observed positive 
if household pass the participation or selection hurdle and the main problem is this 
hurdle is not clearly defined. One cannot say whether a household's participation 
to credit market solely depend on its demand (and that means there is no credit 
rationing), or on its supply (i. e. all household demand for credit), or both. Moreover, 
it is even harder to find a variable influencing the participation but not the loan size, 
using what the data provides. Indeed, identification of participation equation has 
always been at the centre of debates in empirical research using this model. 
In order to take account of the complications and to make our discussion more 
5 Commune population is used for informal sector supply only. 
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consistent, we further assume that: 
(i) Household borrows if and only if he has demand for credit, i. e., participation or 
selection equation always incorporates specifications affecting the demand 
(ii) The loan amount that household received are determined by lender decision on 
credit supply, i. e., outcome equation always includes variables influencing the 
supply 
With these assumptions imposed and the model specifications as in equations 
(4.3) and (4.4), there are four possible specifications as follows 
(1) Pj*j = D?.; L?. = Si*j tj 13 
(2) Pi*j = De-; Le. = (De. & Si*j) Z) ti ti 
(3) Pi*j = (Di*. & Si*j); L!. = Si*j 1 13 
(4) P* = (D!. & Si*j); L!. = (D!. & Si*j) 13 13 23 
Given the exclusion restrictions discussed above, only specification (3) satisfies. 
That is, a household must have demand for credit and the demand is satisfied by 
a supply source then the household can become a borrower, i. e. Pij' = (D!. & Si*j). tj 
In other words, household's participation decision depends on both demand and 
supply channels. However, once a household borrows, loan amount that household 
can obtain is solely determined by supply decision from lender, i. e. Lj*- =* 
.7 
Sij 
4.4 Results 
General specification for variables included in our models is similar to what al- 
ready presented in Section 3.3.2. In short, the following covariates are included in 
the vector Hij: household characteristics (i. e. age, gender, marital status, educa- 
tion level of household head, health condition of household members, household size, 
63 
farm, ir7itated land holding size, house ownership) and commune characteristics (i. e. 
commune population, formal credit per capita, and distance from commune to the 
nearest bank branch). Identification of demand for and supply of credit has also been 
discussed in the previous section and as detail in Section 3.4.2. Further discussion 
of variable construction are given in the Appendix E. Estimations are implemented 
on VLSS1992/93 and VLSS1997/98, for both formal and informal sectors. 
The dependent variable L is the borrowing amount obtained by a household. 
It is measured in thousand VND, and calculated for formal and informal source 
separately. The empirical estimation needs to take account of two complications: 
(1) Borrowing amounts are zero for almost 50 percent of both survey samples, 6 and 
(2) Positive borrowing amount are highly skewed, especially for the formal loans 7. 
In addition, estimators of the limited dependent variable models has been showed 
not robust against specification errors, i. e., in the existence of heteroskedasticity 
or non-normal distribution of the residuals (see, e. g., Maddala and Nelson (1975), 
Arabmazaar and Schmidt (1981)). One common practice to solve these problems is 
to make logarithmic transformation of the interest variables (Maddala, 1983). How- 
ever, without careful consideration, taking log-transformation of the loan amount 
variable will destroy its censoring characteristics because ln(L = 0) is not defined. 
To get over this problem, following Fishe et al (1979) and others, we assume house- 
hold's borrowing amount to be one thousand VND for those with no borrowing in 
the sample 8. Thus, the log-transformation of L will be ln(l + L) rather than ln(L) 
maintaining the censoring point at zero. Distribution of loan size in level and of 
loan size after taking log-transform is presented in Figure C. 1. Similarly, as we con- 
jecture that the marginal impact on loan size to decrease with these variables, we 
also take log-transformations of (one plus) these variables are specified, including 
irrigated land holding size, commune population, and commune-level formal credit 
per capita. 
6That is non-borrowing households are observed having zero loan amount 
71n the VLSS93, mean of formal loan amount is 1,029, median 500, skewness 9.35 and kurtosis 
136.17. In the VLSS98, the numbers respectively are 4,143 (mean); 2000 (median), 8.74 (skewness), 
132.25 (kurtosis) 
81,000 VND =1 unit measuring loan size 
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We start with a simple OLS regression of ln(l + L) on characteristics of house- 
hold and commune, to address the linear relationship, if any. Regression results are 
presented in Table CA with robust standard error, adjusted for clustering to con- 
trol for potential correlation of the error terms corresponding to households living 
in the same commune. In all estimates, the coefficients on household size, working 
adult rate, log commune population, and log formal credit per capita are positive and 
significant. The coefficient on health condition suggests positive effects on loan size 
from both sectors in VLSS1992/93, while it is only significant for informal borrow- 
ing in VLSS1997/98. The coefficients for irrigated land holding are positive in both 
years. Estimated coefficients of education and distance are also as expected. The 
OLS estimate, however, is potentially biased because the sample it selects (house- 
holds with positive loan size) is not representative of the population, as already 
discussed. 
Table C. 2'presents results from Tobit model for pooled VLSS1992/93 and VLSS1997/98 
data, as specified in equation (4.1), to take account of the censored value of loan 
size. Nevertheless, estimated results do not change much from the OLS estimations, 
on both sign of coefficients and significant level. In VLSS1992/93 regression, the 
coefficients on household size and working adult rate remain significant and positive 
for the formal sector, those on age and gender of household head become statistically 
insignificant. The positive effect of bad health status may sound suspicious but it is 
consistent with the stylised facts that consumption loans account for large propor- 
tion of formal loans in 1993. This kind of direct competition between formal and 
informal lenders on consumption credit is confirmed by the significantly negative 
impact of commune formal credit per capita on informal loan size. 
Turning to the VLSS1997/98 results, again the differences between Tobit and 
OLS estimates are not many, even though the Tobit model does show changes in 
significant level for some variables. Similar to the OLS, Tobit results pick up the 
impact of age and education of head on the formal loan size. Households having 
its head being 44 years of age, or spending 7 years in school are found to borrow 
the largest loan amount. The signs and significant levels of the coefficients on house 
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ownership, land holding size, commune population and credit per capita remain the 
same to the OLS results, reassuring the importance of collateralisable assets and 
commune popularity in determining household's formal borrowing. The positive 
and significant coefficient on DIST1 vaxiable implies that households residing close 
to bank branch would borrow larger loans. Estimated results for the informal sector 
are as expected. Bad health condition of household members and large commune 
population are positively associated with informal loan size. The negative and sig- 
nificant of the coefficient on credit per capita suggest the competition between formal 
and informal lenders. 
Nevertheless, the Tobit estimates are also suffered from some drawbacks, as dis- 
cussed in Section 4.2. In what follows, we present results from estimates of the 
selection models specified in equation (4.3) and (4.4), which incorporate a participa- 
tion process to take account of the selection bias that may arise from the treatment 
of zero value of the outcome. There are two cases regarding the relationship between 
selection and outcome processes, measuring in correlation of the estimate errors. As 
already noted, if the correlation coefficient p., = 0, the system can be estimated 
by a probit regression for participation and OLS regression for the loan size. The 
latter results are exactly the same to what we obtained in Table C. 1. Thus, it is not 
necessary to repeat that result here. 
In the case that p., =A 0 or in other words, participation process has influence 
on the outcome, a Heckman two-step estimation is applied. Results are in Table 
C. 3. We however only estimates the model for the formal sector because of our in- 
ability to find defensible identification for the informal sector participation process. 
The participation equation estimates are obtained from probit regression of discrete 
borrowing variable (CRF =1 if borrow) on regressors of household characteristics. 
In 1993, the results show that participation to the formal sector is significantly in- 
fluenced by household size, land holding size, and commune population. However, 
turning to the credit amount, household size seems not to be a significant factor. 
Instead, number of working adult in the household significantly and positively in- 
crease the amount. The interesting result is the negative sign of the coefficient on 
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farm which indicates that peasant households borrow less than average. That is, 
poor rural households who seem to borrow most often are not those who borrow the 
largest loan amount. 
Generally, the results in 1997/98 are consistent with the estimates using 1992/93 
data but with more significant coefficients. The coefficients on farm remains statis- 
tically insignificant. The DIST1 significantly positively affect the participation but 
not the loan size. This result is different from what we obtain from the Tobit model, 
suggesting selection may cause noise in the Tobit results. 
Further more, it is important to note that the coefficients on the inverse Mills 
ratio are statistically significant at 10% level. Though the Heckman second-step 
estimates of the outcome equation with inclusion of the inverse Mills ratio are still 
consistent, the 10% significancy implies that selection bias is relatively weak. In 
addition, in the VLSS1997/98 regression the identification variable of health condi- 
tion is not statistically significant within conventional level. The estimation of the 
Heckman model therefore is identified solely by the non-linearity of the inverse Mills 
ratio. As pointed out by Sartori (2003), the insignificant of identification variable 
would make the model results somehow inconclusive. 
The Heckman selection model can also be estimated using a one-stage procedure 
using maximum likelihood method9 which is less consistent but more efficient com- 
pared to the two-stage procedure. However, the regression cannot converge using 
the VLSS1997/98 data due to the weak identification as mentioned above. Hence, 
we are not going further with the Heckman one-stage procedure. 
To check the robustness of our results, we employ a double hurdle model to es- 
timate the equation system specified, in (4.3) and (4.4). Instead of observing loan 
amount given that the participation condition Pi*j >0 satisfied, the double hurdle 
model requires further that L!. must also be greater than zero (i. e. Lý- > 0). Thus 
.7Z. 7 
the probability of observation of Lij is driven by a bivariate process rather than only 
'The likelihood function of the model is L= rIP(Pi*, !ý OjIf (LijlHij, Pi*j > O)P(Pi'j > 
01 
0). The where assumptions on the error terms are (uij, cij)-N(O, 0, a2,2 u a. 
2, puý, ) and au 
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by the selection process as in the Heckman model (Fennema 2005, p. 109)". Results 
from the double hurdle estimates are presented in Table C. 411. We only run the 
regression the formal sector data as the regression on informal sector cannot con- 
12 verge . In both years, the results confirm the positive impacts of education, number 
of working adult, commune population, and commune credit per capita on borrowing 
amount. The coefficient on farm are negative and significant in 1992/93. However, 
the Wald test for the independent errors between selection and outcome equations 
cannot be rejected (p = 0.1089). In 1998, the regression reports highly significant 
coefficients on commune population, and commune credit per capita. The distance 
dummy is again affecting participation but not the loan size. The coefficients on age 
of head, education, and house ownership are significant with expected signs. Tests 
for hypothesis of independent errors are rejected (p = 0.0000). 
The VLSS panel data is also available, as described in Section 2.2. However, 
we will not employ the panel data analysis for several reasons. Firstly, the time 
span between the two surveys is relatively long (five years). During this period, 
the structure of the Vietnamese economy had changed quickly and so did the rural 
credit market. Assessing determinants of household's loan size would become a 
challenge to incorporate this development of economic infrastructure. Secondly, our 
main aim is to understand how borrowing and lending behaviours had change from 
1992/93 to 1997/98. To satisfy this objective a comparison between results of two 
cross-sectional data covering two studied period will be the best strategy. Because 
of these given points, we will only employ panel data model in the next chapter to 
evaluate impacts of credit on household consumption. 
IoThe likelihood for the double hurdle model, as described in (Jones 1992), is L= rj[I - 
0 
(, yHiPj+t (L-PHil)) 
1- 
1 Where 4D is the density Pug Puc 
+fV 
of the bivariate normal distribution; (uij, eij)-N(O, 0,0,2,0,2, pu,, ) and a2 ugu "Estimation is done by the dhurdle command in Stata, which is developed by (Fennema 2005) 
12 The problem of inability to get programme converged is not uncommon in maximum likelihood 
estimation, especially in the case of the double hurdle model. As noted in Jones (1992) and 
Camaron et. al. (2005, p. 551) this convergence difficulty has been a great limitation for the 
double hurdle model and it continues to discourage researchers from applying this model. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyse the determinants of credit amount obtained by rural house- 
holds. Tobit model is used to account for the censoring characteristics of borrowing 
amount, where its value from non-borrowing household observation is zero. How- 
ever, it is shown that Tobit model is not appropriate model due to its limitation in 
explaining the selection process. Borrowing household first need to have access to 
credit source before the loan amount can be decided. 
Heckman model is employed to address the selection bias. The results show 
that fixed assets variables such as house, land holding, or human capital variables 
such as education, and number of working adult in the household are among the 
most important factors affecting household's credit participation. However, the 
credit amount seems to be driven by commune level formal credit per capita, and 
population, rather than any other variables. 
The statistics of the inverse Mill-ratio, which is used to correct for the selection 
bias in the Heckman model, is significant at 10% level, suggesting the selection may 
not be consistent. To strengthen the results, we employ double-hurdld model which 
allow us to estimate the selection and outcome process in a bivariate procedure. 
Results from double-hurdle confirms the importance of correcting for selection bias. 
House, land and commune credit per capita continues to have positive and significant 
impacts on credit amount. This suggests that wealthier households may enjoy both 
of better access and higher loan amounts from the formal sector. 
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Chapter 5 
The Impact of Formal Credit in 
Rural Vietnam 
5.1 Introduction 
Lack of access to productive capital is generally seen as one cause of poverty in 
rural areas of developing countries. Reasons for this shortage of financial services 
are many. On one hand, commercial banks have little incentive to expand their 
operations in poor areas because of high cost and tremendous risk, as analysed in 
Hoff & Stiglitz (1990). On the other hand, the poor often find themselves excluded 
from the formal credit market because they cannot either meet the eligible conditions 
or be able to put up acceptable collateral as usually required by formal institutions. 
Even though poor people may still be able to obtain credit from alternative informal 
sources, such as moneylenders or relatives, such lenders with limited resources often 
charge extremely high interest rates on short term and small size loans making them 
unreliable providers of investment capital. 
Since the 1970s, the poor in developing world have started to gain better access. 
to formal credit thanks to the development of microfinance programmes, inspired 
by the success of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The number of people received 
credit from microfinance institutions worldwide rose dramatically from 13 million 
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by 1997 to 113 millions by 2006 (Daley-Haxris 2006). Microfinance has become 
an important instrument to alleviate poverty in political agenda, capturing much 
attention from policy makers. In the academic world, economists have also shown 
increased interest in microfinance. A number of works have studied to explain 
how and why the microfinance works, particularly to understand how it solves the 
problem of asymmetric information that discourages commercial banks from lending 
to the poor. Other issues attracting lots of economic research are mechanism of 
joint-liability group lending, financial sustainability and outreach, and above all, 
the evaluation of impact of credit programmes on poverty. That is, regardless of 
how microcredit programmes work, how many clients these programmes serve, the 
crucial question that economists and policy makers ultimately want to answer is 
how credit accessibility affects the life of borrowers. 
In the theoretical economic literature, the role of capital in production and eco- 
nomic development is well established, but it is harder to estimate the respective 
contribution of capital especially at household or individual level. As in rural agricul- 
tural production, capital would serve to finance farming activities, to insure harvest 
against production risk, and to help people smooth consumption in the face of income 
shock. In practice, however, simply making cheap credit available to the poor has 
been proved to not always work by the evidence of the failure of many subsidised 
credit programmes in developing countries, for example in India and Philippines, 
from 1950s through out the beginning of 1970s. The new wave of microfinance de- 
velopment urges researchers to produce careful evaluation of credit programmes to 
find the impacts of credit accessibility, or in other words, to answer how borrowers 
would have done without taking loans. 
Unlike natural science where effects could mostly be measured through experi- 
mentation in a strictly controlled environment to judge the causal direction of the 
relationship being studied and rninimise potential biases, it is usually hard and 
costly to set up experiments in economic research. Indeed, most empirical evalu- 
ations of credit programme have been using data collected from designed surveys 
(non-experimental) and employing econometric techniques to control for unwanted 
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effects from other factors. That is, an impact evaluation must estimate the coun- 
terfactual to find how the results would change had the programme never taken 
place. 
However, econometric estimations based on non-experimental data may suffer 
from potential biases. In the situation of measuring credit programme impacts, gen- 
erally, the biases will arise from two main sources: the non-randomness of credit pro- 
gramme placements and the endogeneity of programme participation or self-selection 
into credit programme by households'. In the former problem, the availability of 
formal credit is unlikely to be randomly allocated across geographical regions but en- 
dogenously determined by institutions. In other words, formal institutions carefully 
select areas of operation and that decision on where/whether to provide financial 
services causes potential biases for impact evaluation. Cleaxly, the selected commune 
is not necessarily a "better" commune compared to others; it may be poorer as result 
of credit targeted. By comparing the incidence of poverty in "credit-available" and 
"credit-unavailable" areas, which are different in characteristics, researchers may 
mistakenly report biased results. 
Additionally, households who have taken credit may be systematically different 
from others who have not. When the characteristics that cause these differences 
are observable (e. g. age, education, assets) and are taken into account, the impact 
evaluation should be less problematic. Often, though, the differences arise from 
the so-called self-selection process, driven by unobserved traits of borrowers such 
as enterpreneurial skills, hardworking or better focus. Moreover, formal lenders 
are unlikely provide credit at random but usually select clients based on screen- 
ing applicant's characteristics. In many cases, borrowing eligibility conditions are 
even predetermined. The nonrandom credit could (self-)selectively allocate to ei- 
ther richer or poorer borrowers. A simple evaluation of credit programme without 
calculating these attributions, will be very likely biased. For example, measuring 
impacts of credit by comparing the increase of consumption between the poorer 
borrowing households who received credit through a poverty reduction programme 
1 Especially in the case of group lending 
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with the not-that-poor non-borrowing households who were nPt eligible to join the 
programme, one may overestimate the programme effects2. 
The econometric literature suggests several methods to address the selection bias 
problems, including matching, difference-in-difference and instrumental variables. 
The general idea of these methods is to incorporate the selection process in statistical 
models to arrive at an unbiased estimate i. e. matching method using exogenous 
eligible condition of lender to separate borrowers from non-borrowers for comparison; 
instrumental variable method using exogenous instrument to separate borrowing 
activities from household outcomes. As pointed out in Cameron (2005), the validity 
of those models depends on how well the models are specified. Unfortunately, the 
majority of existing empirical studies on credit programme so far are of descriptive 
nature or fail to adequately address the selection bias in the estimate model'. The 
collection of few serious empirical studies, however, presents mixed results. Pitt 
and Khandker (1998), by using a quasi-experiment data of the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh to construct instrumental variables for individual credit participation 
and applying village fixed effects estimation to control for unobserved village-level 
heterogeneity, find that joining credit programme increases annual consumption of 
borrowers, especially of female borrowers. Khandker (2005) employs the analysis of 
panel data from Bangladesh to eliminate the differences in characteristics of credit 
programme location and borrower's unobservable attributes that do not change over 
time, reports the positive results. Also using data from Bangladesh to measure 
total and noncredit impacts of credit programmes on farm productivity, McKernan 
(2002), treating credit activities as endogenous and correcting for selection bias, 
finds evidence of large positive effects. 
Nevertheless, there are other studies reporting the opposite results. For example, 
Coleman (1999) and (2002) take the advantage of data on prospective borrowers in 
Northeast Thailand, where households were self-selected to join the village bank 
'As in e. g. Hossain (1988) who incorrectly presents evidence of the positive impact of the 
Grameen Bank without control for selection biases. 
3 See Morduch & Haley (2002) for a comprehensive review of recent literature on impact assess- 
ment. 
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programme but some of them were forced to wait one year before getting their first 
loans. This provides an unique way to address the selection biases. Coleman finds 
the programme loans having little impact on household consumption. Morduch 
(1998) uses the same dataset in Pitt and Khandker (1998) but estimates the impact 
by an alternative method, the difference-in-difference estimation with careful con- 
sideration of the de facto member selection into credit programme, finds no evidence 
of positive effects. 
Thus, impact assessment exercise is surprisingly difficult to implement cleanly. 
At the heart of most empirical argument is the problem of identification, that is to 
separate out the causality relationship of credit and variables of interest outcomes. 
Aghion (2005) suggests the use of interest rates, lender characteristics or distance 
to/from the closest main city as instrument variables for loan impact but each has 
limitations. The interest rate hardly varies within a lender and also among lenders 4. 
This is a key constraint for the interest rate playing its role because variation is 
necessary for identification. So do characteristics of rural lenders. The variable of 
distance is an option that we have adopted and will continue to be used in this 
chapter to identify credit participation. 
Following the literature on impact evaluation discussed above and the results 
presented in the previous chapters, we consider self-selection as the main source 
of potential bias that we need to address in our estimation models. Unlike other 
microfinance studies where credit programmes may not operate in all studied vil- 
lages (and hence non-randomness of programme placement requires attention), pro- 
gramme placement across communes in Vietnam is not a problem using VLSS data 
set. According to results in Chapter 3, credit institutions are found to almost 
uniformly distributed aanong communes in Vietnam'. However, it is possible that 
lending institutions do not homogeneously operate among areas. Households from 
some particular communes may find easier to obtain credit compared to households 
'In Vietnam, study by McCarty (2001) shows that as many as 70 out of 78 formal institutions 
included in the survey set interest rates with reference to the government banks, such as VBARD. 5Formal credit institutions are reported to operate in all 135 communes in VLSS1997/98 and 
in 115 out of 120 communes in VLSS1992/93 
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living elsewhere due to targeted credit programmes or being close to a formal insti- 
tution's branch office. This problem will be addressed by employing commune-level 
instrumental variables such as distance from commune committee to the nearest 
bank branch or commune credit per capita. As analysed above, these variables well 
capture variation of credit among household residing in different communes. 
Similar to the previous chapters, this chapter is going to use data from the 
VLSS1992/93 and the VLSS1997/98. One development is a panel data set will be 
created based on these two surveys. We estimate impacts using both cross-sectional 
and panel data. In all regressions, the dependent variable (household's outcome) is 
real consumption per capita which is adjusted to commune price level to make it 
comparable between households from different communes. The credit variable which 
we would like to measure the impact of is household's formal credit per household 
member6. That is only impact of borrowing from the formal sector will be studied. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 first sets up the econometric 
model to estimate the impacts using cross-sectional data. Instrumental variables are 
employed to overcome potential biases of OLS estimations. Results are presented 
and discussed. Section 5.3 explains how longitudinal data can solve problem of 
simultaneity biases and describes estimation framework followed by results. Section 
5.4 is conclusion. 
5.2 Impact Assessments using Cross-Sectional Data 
5.2.1 Econometric Specification 
Consider the following model linking credit and household outcome 
Yij = go + P, Lij + 02Hri + tljy + Uij 
'See Appdendix A for more details 
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where Yij is the real per capita expenditure7 of household i in commune j; Lij the 
household per capita borrowing amount from the formal sector and, 81 the coefficient 
to be estimated which measuring the impact of borrowing; 14j the unmeasured com- 
mune j fixed effects (time invariant) on commune credit availability and household 
outcomes; Hij the vector of household and commune characteristics; uij the error 
term representing unmeasured household and commune characteristics that affect 
the outcomes. 
The impact of credit on household consumption 01 can be obtained by estimating 
equation 5.1 with ordinary least squares. This result will consistently estimate the 
causal effect of credit only if credit obtained by household is randomly assigned in 
the population. However, as discussed previously, credit has been long considered 
endogenous that associates with self-selected participation and thus f3i"' cannot 
be interpreted as the coefficient capturing impact of credit. 
A standard way to approach problems of endogeneity and simultaneity bias is to 
use instrumental variables that explain the credit amount obtained by household, but 
that have no direct influence on household consumption. Then the estimated credit 
variable basing on instrumental variables can be used to correct for the selection 
bias in assessing impact of credit in the outcome equation. Thus, the borrowing 
amount by the i" household in the j" commune can be expressed as 
Lij ý-- 00 + OlZij + 02HL L (5.2) ij + 113 + vij 
where Zjj is the vector of instrumental variables that will not appear in the 
outcome equation; Hi'j the vector of commune and household characteristics de- 
termining credit amount; yj the unmeasured commune j fixed effects influencing 
household's credit activities; vij the normally distributed error terms, satisfying 
E(vjjjHj'j, Zjj) = 0. All other variable specifications are as before. 13 
The idea of using instrumental variable approach may be simple but economic 
'Henceforth called in short as household consumption/expenditure 
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research shows that finding convincing instrumental variables has been frustrating. 
Generally, a valid instrumental variable must satisfy two requirements: (i) it must 
be correlated with the endogenous variable (i. e., corr(Zij, Lij) =A 0) and (ii) it must 
have no direct association with the error term (i. e., corr(Zij, uij) = 0). The former 
requirement of instrumental variable's relevance has attracted much attention in the 
literature in recent years, largely motivated by the Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) 
paper. Staiger and Stock (1997) provide a complete analysis of this issue high- 
lighting the problem of weak correlation between instruments and the endogenous 
variables. The key result is that using weak instruments can still persist substantial 
bias even in, large finite samples. F-statistics for the test of joint null hypothesis that 
the coefficients on excluded instruments in the first stage equal zero has emerged as 
an indicator to avoid the weak instrument problem8. 
The latter requirement of orthogonality of a valid instrument is harder to test. 
When the equation is exactly identified, i. e., the number of endogenous variables 
equal the number of instruments, then test is not possible. Only when the equa- 
tion is over-identified, i. e., the number of instruments is more than the number of 
endogenous variables, an over-identifying restriction test can be applied to inspect 
whether the suspect instrument is valid, i. e., being independent with the error term 
of the outcome equation. ' 
Finding at least one valid instrument for the loan amount is indeed a crucial task 
in our study. Following previous discussion on determinant of credit participation 
(see Chapters 3 and 4, and particularly section 3.4.2), there are two variables that 
we could consider to use as instruments for household borrowing. The first is the 
distance from commune to the nearest formal bank branch and the second is the 
formal credit per capita in each commune. It has been shown in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 that both of these variables work well to explain the supply of formal 
credit while having little impact on household's credit demand. In Chapter 4 we find 
that the distance variable significantly reduce credit amount that a household would 
BAlso mentioned in Staiger and Stock (1997) paper, among others such as Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman (2003), Stock and Yogo (2005), there is a rule of thumb that as long as the first stage 
F-statistics >10, the weak instrument problem is substantially avoided. 
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receive while commune credit per capita would positively correlated with loan size. 
Similar argument can be imposed here. We argue that the distance and the commune 
per capita credit variables have no direct relationship with household consumption. 
They affect household consumption only through the channel of credit. 
5.2.2 Results 
The OLS regression results are presented in Table D. 1. Commune fixed-effects are 
applied to capture the commune's time-invariant characteristics that may affect the 
commune's credit availability and household outcomes. Standard errors are robust 
and adjusted for clustering on commune. Regressions are run on both VLSS1992/93 
and VLSS1997/98 cross-sectional data to estimate impacts of borrowing from the 
formal sector. The dependent variable (Yij) is log of household real per capita 
expenditure which is adjusted by commune price level. The credit variable is the 
log of (one plus) household formal borrowing amount per capita. As before, other 
household and commune characteristics are included as control variables. 
In 1992/93, the coefficients of interest are small and positive in both OLS and 
OLS-FE regressions, but only significant in the latter case. Other regressors includ- 
ing age of household head, marital status, number of working adult in household, 
education level, log of commune population, and log of commune credit per capita 
are all found to have positive and significant effects on household consumption. 
Similarly, regressions (3 & 4) of 1997/98 data find these household characteristics 
statistically improve consumption. Coefficients on household size are significant and 
negative in all regressions, which is, however, not a surprise. The negative sign 
of coefficients on farm and agriculture land holding size suggests self-consumption. 
i. e., the outcome variable of consumption does not incorporate household's self- 
consumption value. Thus, being a farmer with large land holding will significantly 
reduce household's expenditure recorded in the data due to self-supply of both food 
and non-foodstuffs. 
"'One plus" is an ad hoc but common techinique used to avoid problem of undefined log(O). 
The zero is the borrowing amount of non-borrowing households. 
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While general household characteristics behave as expected and consistent with 
different specifications, the coefficients reflecting impacts of credit axe small (smaller 
than 0.01) and insignificant (excepted in regression (2)). Based on the OLS FE 
results only, one may conclude that borrowing does not have any effects on borrower's 
consumption. However, we have discussed previously that using simple regressions 
of OLS FE without careful consideration for potential biases arise from non-random 
selection of borrowers will generate misleading results. For instance, if borrowing 
decision and borrowing amount are not randomly provided among household sample 
(which is very much unlikely), then borrowing becomes endogenously determined 
and OLS estimates are inconsistent. The tests for hypothesis that credit variable 
can be treated as exogenous have been rejected at 1% level in all regressions (see 
Table D. 2). 
Instrumental variables are employed to solve problem of endogeneity. The log 
(one plus) of formal borrowing amount will be estimated as in equation 5.2 using 
three instruments LNCAP; DIST1; and DIST2 for 1997/98, and one instrument 
LNCAP for 1992/93. The predicted value of credit is then used to estimate the 
outcome equation 5.1. All instruments are excluded from outcome equation. Stan- 
dard errors are again robust and adjust for clustering within commune. Results are 
shown in Table D. 2. 
In Table D. 2, regression (1) presents results of IV estimation using 1992/93 
data. The coefficient on credit becomes large (0.142) and statistically significant at 
1% level. High value of the first-stage F-statistics (50.44) confirms that LNCAP is 
indeed a powerful instrument explaining variation of credit amount. Other variables 
of household characteristics remain their signs as in the OLS FE regressions with 
the same or stronger significant level. 
Regressions (2) to (5) are from 1997/98 data. Again, the coefficients of interest 
in all regressions turns consistently positive (0.11) and significant at 1% level. Re- 
gression (2) is estimated using three instruments LNCAP; DIST1 and DIST2, with 
first-stage F-statistics equals 119.29 implying weak instrument problem is clearly 
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avoided. However, the LR test for redundancy of DIST1 and DIST2 cannot be 
rejected (p(X2(2)) = 0.16), suggesting efficiency of the estimation is not improved 
by using one (or both) of these instruments. To check the robustness, regressions 
(3), (4) and (5) drop DIST2, DIST1, and both of the instruments out of estimation, 
respectivelylO. The coefficient on credit are unchanged, remaining value at 0.11 and 
significant at 1% level across regressions. First-stage F-statistics are large in all 
cases (>100). Hansen J-statistics of over-identification are overall small indicating 
the validity of the instruments used. 
In summary, the OLS FE estimates are shown to be inconsistent in case of credit 
endogeneity. Under simple OLS estimations, credit is found having no significant 
effects on household consumption. Estimations are improved by employing instru- 
mental variables to identify variation of borrowing amount. We find that, on average, 
taking credit does improve household consumption in both surveys. Because both 
consumption and credit are in logarithm form, the relationship is an elasticity. For 
instance, in 1992/93, the IV results (see Table D. 2) suggest that one percent increase 
in average formal borrowing amount per capita would yield 0.14 percent increase in 
the average consumption per capita. Similarly, inl997/98,0.11 percent increase in 
average consumption per capita would be expected if formal borrowing per capita 
increases by one percent. 
5.3 Impact Assessments using Longitudinal Data 
5.3.1 Addressing Contemporaneous Impacts 
Despite the promising results that have been presented, the instrumental variable 
estimations on cross-sectional data faces several fundamental limitations. Firstly, 
cross-section results may not be robust as it often depends significantly on statisti- 
cal methods that used to address problem of endogeneity (i. e., credit participation) 
1OWhen LNCAP is droped, DIST1 and DIST2 becomes insignificant in the first-stage regression 
and F-stat is small (0.94). This suggests LNCAP should be kept as the main instrument in all 
regressions. 
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and relatively strong assumptions that statistical framework bases on. Some stud- 
ies show that sophisticated econometric model does not necessarily mean that the 
methodology could overcome limitation of cross-section data and provide reliable 
results (see, for example, Lalonde (1986)). 
Secondly, using cross-sectional data cannot solve the problem of contemporane- 
ous impact. Due to the fungible characteristics of credit, by borrowing household 
could temporarily increase consumption by spending all or part of loans they ob- 
tained on food or consumer goods rather than use the borrowing money to buy 
essential inputs for production. Report of consumption during or short-time after 
household's borrowing will be potentially upward biased. These drawbacks of cross- 
sectional data is generally recognised and a clear solution to improve the results is 
to employ longitudinal data which enable us to observe borrower's consumption in 
over time. 
While longitudinal data analysis is widely applied in economic research, it is less 
popular in credit impact studies due to unavailability of data. To date, the most 
comprehensive work using panel data is from Khandker (2005). In the paper, 
Khandker estimates the impact of credit received on borrower's consumption by 
employing household-level fixed-effect method using full panel data collected from 
Bangladesh. To reduce estimation biases due to measurement error in data collection 
and time-varying heterogeneity of household characteristics, Khandker also employs 
eligible condition of land holding size as instrumental variable for borrowing activi- 
ties. His results from panel data show that cross-section analysis does overestimate 
impacts of borrowingil. 
The VLSS data set has two periods of data on each respondent household, pro- 
viding us a solution for contemporaneous impact problem. With the record of house- 
hold borrowing activities in 1992/93, we could assess credit impacts on the same 
household's consumption in 1997/98. There are two clear reasons to do so. First, 
"Earlier, Pitt and Khandker (1998) use cross-section data from the first round survey and find 
that borrowing would increase annual consumption of female borrowers by 18 taka. Employing 
panel data, Khanker (2005) finds smaller increase of 8 taka. 
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investments take time to pay off and we would like to see how much help credit could 
be in enhancing borrower's consumption in long term. Second, using lags variable 
would reduce problem of simultaneity effects between credit and consumption. If we 
estimate impacts of preceding credit on current consumption, then it is reasonable 
to suppose that household's current consumption and other characteristics cannot 
affect lagged borrowing directly. However, if there is a variable that affects con- 
sumption today as well as borrowing activities yesterday such as household's land 
holding size, then today consumption may be indirectly correlated with lagged credit 
amount. Hence, problem of simultaneity cannot be avoided completely. 
To account for this still a possible problem, we employ instrumental variables 
for credit amount in 1992/93. As such, we estimate the following system: 
V8 
ii 0+ 010 +, 82Hij8 + f1jy + Uij (5.3) 0 Z.? 
0 Ceo + alZij + AJL + Vij (5.4) tj 
wy here , , 
ý8 is the real per capita expenditure in 1997/98 of the household i in 
the commune j; Hjý§ the corresponding household characteristics in 1997/98; Yj 3 
the commune-level fixed-effects; and Zjj the vector of instrumental variables that is 
correlated with credit amount obtained by household in 1992/93, but that would 
not directly influence household consumption in 1997/98. 
ýelection of variables to include in Zjj is basing on the results from Chapter 4. 
These variables must significantly correlated with borrowing amount in 1992/93, 
therefore the instruments are also in lagged time. The first variable to include is 
the 1992/93 log of (one plus) commune credit per capita which has been proved as 
a strong instrument for formal credit variation. Others 1992/93 variables employed 
as instruments consist household size, number of working adult in the household, 
health status of household head and his/her spouse, log of (one plus) irrigated land 
holding size, and log of (one plus) commune population, which are all significant at 
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1% level in determining credit amount (see Table C. 2). Further specification tests 
will be carried out to check the validity of these instruments. 
5.3.2 Results 
The longitudinal sample is constructed basing on households who appear in both 
1992/93 and 1997/98 suýveys. Of the 3,839 rural households included in the 1992/93 
sample, 3,364 households are re-interviewed in 1997/98, which constitute the number 
of household in the longitudinal data. 
The dependent variable for us to measure the impacts of credit is the log of (one 
plus) real per capita expenditure in 1997/98. As discussed before, we expect this 
variable to be positively influenced by household variables such as number of working 
adult or education of household head, while it may negatively correlated with others 
such as working in farm or household size. The credit variable is measured by log 
of (one plus) per capita credit amount, but in the lagged value. That is we measure 
impact of borrowing in 1992/93 on the consumption in 1997/98. Some control 
variables like land holding size, commune credit per capita, and commune population 
also appear in logarithm form, as before. Estimate results of the equation 5.3 are 
shown in Table D. 3. 
We start with OLS regression (1) which treats borrowing in 1992/93 as ex- 
ogenous variable. No effect of credit has been found. The coefficient of interest 
is small (0.006) and not significant within the conventional level. Regressions (2) 
to (6) employ instrumental variables for the 1992/93 credit variable which is sus- 
pected to behave endogenously. Regression (2) is estimated by two-stage methods 
using 6 instruments for the credit variable: HHSIZE93, HHADULT93, HEALTH93, 
LNLAND93, LNPOP93, and LNCAP93. The coefficient on log credit becomes sig- 
nificant at 5% level. First-stage F-statistics (9.77) is close to the threshold (10), 
indicating a possible weak instrument problem. The Hansen J-statistics (J=26.12; 
p=0.00) strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments axe independent of 
the second-stage errors, suggesting existence of invalid instruments. GMM estimate 
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is applied in regression (3) using the same regressors and instruments as in (2) to 
generate efficient estimates of the coefficients as well as consistent estimates of the 
standard errors (Baum et al, 2003). The coefficient of interest remains significant 
at 10% level; other coefficients mostly unchanged. 
To cope with the invalid instrument problem that picked up in regression (2) 
and (3), regression (4) only keeps 3 strongest instruments basing on the t-statistics 
in the first-stage regression (2). The remaining ones are HEALTH93, LNLAND93, 
LNCAP93. GMM estimates is done in regression (5). Results are not much im- 
proved, even though F-statistics (18.32) suggesting weak instruments are now avoided. 
The coefficients on credit are almost unchanged (0.09) at 5% significant level. How- 
ever, statistics of over-identification test remain large. 
One possible explanation for correlation between the lagged instruments and 
the current consumption is little variation overtime (5 years) of some household 
characteristics, such as size of households, commune population, or land holding size. 
While these variables certainly have their influence on credit activities in 1992/93, 
they may also persist as important factors determining consumption in 1997/98. 
The lagged household characteristics appear not to be good instrument overall. 
Regression (6) holds LNCAP93 as the only instrument. The results gain strength. 
The coefficient of interested variable is positive, higher in value (0.113), and signifi- 
cant at 1% level. Weak instrument problem is eliminated (F-stat=44.32). Specifica- 
tion test for the null hypothesis that credit variable can be treated as exogenous is 
rejected at 1% level (p=0.00) suggesting instrumental variable is more appropriate 
method for estimating the consumption effects of borrowing". The finding is in line 
with previous results using cross-sectional data. Thus, borrowing from the formal 
sector has a significant positive effect on per capita consumption. 
12Because the specification is exactly identified, we cannot test for the validity of this only 
instrument. 
84 
5.3.3 Alternative Specifications 
The final step to assess the robustness of our results is to exploit full potential of 
the panel data. Different from the study of lagged credit which quietly simplifies 
the impacts of recent borrowing and weights more on far-lagged borrowing, in this 
section we assess impacts by investigating how changes in credit affect changes in 
outcomes. 
Recalling the outcome equation (5.1) that we modify to incorporate time period 
Yijt = Po + P, Lijt + 02Hijt + Yj + Vii + Uij (5.5) 
where Yjjt is the real per capita expenditure of household i in commune j at the 
period t(1992/93,1997/98); pj and vij are unmeasured determinants of household's 
credit activities that are time invariant and fixed within a commune j and a house- 
hold i, respectively; Lijt, Hijt are credit and characteristic variables specified as in 
the previous models; ujjt is the error term. 
As before, we are interested in estimating the coefficient 01, which reflects the 
average impacts of credit. Unlike prior models where only cross-section commune 
fixed-effect is possible, panel data allows us to estimate a model with household 
fixed effects specified. That is vij captures nonrandom household selection into the 
formal credit programme, such as household's management ability, energy level or 
talents. Similar to commune fixed effects pj, vij is also assumed not changing over 
time. Because the household fixed effects method also resolves any commune-level 
endogeneity (Khandker, 2005), we can simplify our model by ornitting commune 
level unmeasured fixed effects (pj) from equation (5.5) 
An alternative to fixed effects is to apply random effects regression for the panel 
model. The fundamental difference between the two methods is that while fixed 
effects regression remove the unobserved effect which can be any time-constant ex- 
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planatory variables determining credit activities of a household, the random effects 
estimator is attractive when the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the ex- 
planatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002). In our case, household's unobserved char- 
acteristics, which are thought to affect its credit activities such as management 
skills, may be well correlated with included household variables. Hence, fixed effects 
estimation appears to be the appropriate selection13. 
With a panel data set containing two period of observations like the VLSSs, 
household fixed-effect estimation is the same as differencing the data by household 
and running a cross-section regression on the differenced data. By taking the dif- 
ference between 1992/93 and 1997/98, the time invariant commune and household 
characteristics are eliminated. Selection bias problem due to omitted unobservable 
variables is controlled. A consistent estimate of the impact 31 is more likely to 
obtained. 
Results of the fixed-effect estimate are presented in Table DA The coefficient on 
credit variable remains positive (0.03) and significant at 1% level. Several variables 
at commune and household level have been dropped because of the differencing, 
such as the distance, number of years in school of household head. These variables 
are either unchanged over time or not available in both surveys. 
Finally, because the household fixed-effect method may still not yield consis- 
tent estimates of the credit effects using panel data if our assumption on the time 
invariant of vij is violated, i. e., the unmeasured household specific characteristics 
may change over time. For example, experience could be learnt differently between 
households, and hence production and consumption growth may vary, leading to 
inconsistent estimation. A standard solution to correct this time-varying hetero- 
geneity is to use instrumental variables. As before, we employ credit per capita 
at commune-level as the instrument for household credit. Test result (see Table 
DA) shows that household-level fixed-effect instrumental variable (FE-IV) method 
13T6 be certain, we carry out a Hausman test which compares the fixed effects and random effects 
estimates by testing the hypothesis that there is no correlation between unobserved fixed effects 
and included explanatory variables. The test result (Chi2(12)=449.78, p>chi2=0.0000) rejects the 
hypothesis. In other words, fixed effects is prefered to random effects. 
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is more appropriate in estimating effects of credit on household consumption. 
Column (2) in Table DA presents FE-IV results. The coefficient of interest is 
0.263 and significant at 1% level. This value is greater than any other estimated 
coefficients of credit. The OLS results in Section D. 1 reveal no significant impacts of 
borrowing in both cross-section data sets. The OLS-IV results, also on cross-section 
data, show significant effects of about 0.11 (elasticity) after controlling for potential 
bias by employing instrumental variable. Using similar method on longitudinal data 
shows the same result (coefficient of credit = 0.11, significant at 1% level). And the 
results from this section, applying full panel data analysis, display the statistically 
significant coefficients of 0.025 (without instrument) and of 0.263 (with instrument). 
These finding suggests that the estimated coefficients capturing positive impacts of 
credit are quite robust - they are not sensitive to changes in econometric specifica- 
tion. In addition, selection bias is clearly a major problem and not addressing them 
carefully will underestimate the effects of credit, as in our case. 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter aims to assess the impact of formal credit on household consumption 
using data from VLSS1992/93 and VLSS1997/98. Analyses using cross-section and 
longitudinal data have been used. Instrumental variable method is employed to tease 
out the impact of credit on household consumption from other potential influences 
and biases. Results suggest that borrowing from the formal sector significantly 
improves consumption per capita of borrowing households. 
The challenges in impact assessments arise because credit is not provided to 
random households. On one hand, from the supply side, formal credit institutions 
carefully select areas to provide their financial services. The selected area is not 
necessary having "better" economic conditions compared to others, it may be poorer 
as result of credit targeted. However, by comparing the incidence of poverty in 
credit available and credit unavailable areas, which are different in characteristics, 
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researchers may mistakenly report biased results. On the other hand, from the 
demand side, households who have taken credit may be systematically different 
from others who have not. When the characteristics that cause these differences 
are observable (e. g. age, education, assets) and are taken into account, impact 
evaluation would be less problematic. However, the differences often arise from self- 
selection process, which are driven by unobserved traits of borrowers, such as ability. 
A simple evaluation of credit programme without calculating these attributions will 
be biased. 
We use instrumental variable to identify the credit amount that household ob- 
tained. The variables of credit per capita at commune-level, distance from commune 
committee to the nearest government bank branch (in form of log-transformation 
and dummy) are employed as the instruments. Our results are consistent with other 
studies of the Vietnamese rural credit markets (e. g. Phain et al (2002)) that also 
find positive and significant effects of credit on consumption. In particular, we find 
in our panel analysis that 1 percent increase in average credit per capita borrowed 
from the formal sector leads to 0.26 percent increase in average consumption per 
capita. I 
Controlling for selection biases has been shown to be very important. In our 
study, estimations using simple OLS regression lead us to conclusion of no effects 
of credit. This result is clearly underestimated the more reliable (positive) results 
in which biases have been carefully addressed. However, a reservation should be 
pointed out. That is our core instrumental variables are at commune-level. These 
are useful to control for intra-communal differences in formal credit accessibility 
but they do not allow controlling for inter-commune or household-level unobserved 
characteristics. Although this problem has been addressed by using household fixed- 
effects, and by cluster-robust test statistics and standard errors, results might be 
different if other instrumental -variables had been used. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
The thesis is a contribution to the research literature of the Vietnamese rural credit 
market during 1990s. The data is from the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys carried 
out in 1992/93 and 1997/98, providing both cross-sectional and panel data. We 
aim to answer three main research questions: What are the determinant factors of 
household's accessibility to the formal credit sector in rural Vietnam? What are the 
determinants of credit amount obtained by households? And what axe the impacts 
of taking credit on household consumption? 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Vietnamese rural credit markets. We 
emphasize on some interesting findings from the stylised facts. First, there was a 
big expansion of the formal credit sector. Rom a very low level of 30% market 
share in 1992/93, the formal sector had grown to account for 50% of the rural credit 
markets in 1997/98. However, similar to other developing countries, the Vietnamese 
financial system remains largely underdeveloped with a dual structure in which 
formal and informal sectors exist side by side. 
Second, although the development of formal sector and household borrowing 
activities are not equally distributed across regions, there exists an uniform access 
to formal credit at commune-level, i. e. every commune included in the data had 
access to formal institutions in 1997/98. However, credit access at household-level 
really diverses. The most frequent borrowers are poor households but borrowers 
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who borrow biggest amounts axe rich households. 
Third, interest rates from informal lenders were really high, at about 90% annual 
in 1992/93. Together with the expansion of the formal sector, the interest rates of 
the informal sector had been driven down to approximately 40% annual in 1997/98, 
indicating a growing competition between the two sectors. In term of interest rates, 
formal loans appear to be cheaper than informal loans, however it often requires 
collateral. 
Finally, the existence of informal lenders remains strong in both studied periods, 
presenting a complex linkages between agents in the credit markets. In addition, 
almost fifty percent of lending households axe also borrowers at the same time. The 
existence of borrowing-lenders suggests that financial intermediation are active in 
rural areas. This indicates the different level of credit access among population. 
Some households may find themselves being excluded from the formal credit market 
and they have to seek alternative credit from the informal source, accepting higher 
interest rate and smaller loan amount. 
Chapter 3 is a study assessing determinant factors of household's credit partic- 
ipation in the Vietnamese formal and informal credit markets. The literature on 
this research area is very little. To the best of our knowledge, we can only name 
two articles, Pham et al (2002) and Pharn et al (2007), which have a similar re- 
search question to ours. However, Pham et al (2002) uses a small sample of 300 
households collected by the authors. Pharn et al (2007) uses the VLSS data but 
they includes urban households in their study. Our work is different from the two 
research mentioned above not only in term of data but also in term of methodology. 
We contribute to the literature as the first research attempts to estimate the credit 
demand and the credit supply functions separately to find determinant factors of 
credit access in rural Vietnam. We are also the pioneer in'applying the bivariate 
probit model with partial observability in empirical study using data from Vietnam. 
The contributions and findings from this chapter are briefly summarised as follows. 
Firstly, we find that education of household head has an Inverse u-shape impact 
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on demand for credit. This result implies that low and high education household 
heads seems to have less demand for credit compared to household heads with sec- 
ondary school degree. A possible explanation is that high educated people may be 
easier to find a paid job and they may choose not to work in farm or small self- 
business, therefore even if they have better access to the formal sector, their low 
demand for investment credit reduces the borrowing rate. On the opposite direc- 
tion, there is high propensity that low educated people are poor and less skillful, and 
hence have lower demand for credit. In other words, while educated households may 
be self-rationed out of the formal credit market, low or non-educated households are 
more likely to be rationed out. 
Secondly, the results show that land holding size significantly affects demand 
for and supply of formal credit. This suggests the importance of input capital 
and incentives for investment. On the supply, holding of fixed asset appears to be 
crucial for households to have access to the formal sector due to its requirement 
of collateral. Also demonstrated in our results, variables having impacts on supply 
decisions appears to differ considerably from those shaping household's demand. 
That is, access to the formal sector is primarily determined by regional measures, 
i. e., commune-level credit per capita and distance to bank branch. Indeed, the 
further distance from commune to a government bank branch, the less likely the 
bank will lend to commune's residents. 
Further more, household characteristics determining level of access to the formal 
sector are different over the years between the two surveys, implying changes in 
the financial sector and economic environment. Prediction of formal credit market 
participation is high and increases over years, implying the expansion of the formal 
sector. Credit constraint is cut in half from 34 percent in 1992/93 to just about 15 
percent in 1997/98. Over these years, the predicted demand for formal credit is also 
inflated from 40 percent to 52 percent suggesting household's need for investment 
capital growing with economic development. 
The empirical analysis in the Chapter 4 highlights the determinant factors of 
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credit amount obtained. We started by employing simple OLS and Tobit model to 
cast an overview results. Then the Heckman two-stage model is applied to address 
problem of selection bias. A double-hurdle model is also used to check the robustness 
of the Heckman model's results. This piece of work again contributes as an unique 
study of the determinants of loan size to the literature of Vietnamese rural credit 
market. 
We find that participation to the formal sector is significantly influenced by 
variables of household size, land holding size, and commune population. However, 
turning to the credit amount, household size seems not to be a significant factor. 
Instead, number of working adult in the household significantly and positively in- 
crease the amount. The interesting result is the negative sign of the coefficient on 
farm which indicates that peasant households borrow less than average. That is, 
poor rural households who seem to borrow most often are not those who borrow the 
largest loan size. Wealthier households are those who enjoy both better access and 
higher loan amounts from the formal sector. 
The last chapter aims to assess the impact of formal credit on household con- 
sumption. Analyses using cross-section and longitudinal data have been used. The 
challenges in impact assessments arise because credit is not provided to random 
households. On one hand, from the supply side, formal credit institutions carefully 
select areas to provide their financial services. The selected area is not necessary 
having "better" economic conditions compared to others, it may be poorer as result 
of credit targeted. However, by comparing the incidence of poverty in credit avail- 
able and credit unavailable areas, which are different in characteristics, researchers 
may mistakenly report biased results. On the other hand, from the demand side, 
households who have taken credit may be systematically different from others who 
have not. When the characteristics that cause these differences are observable (e. g., 
age, education, assets) and are taken into account, impact evaluation would be less 
problematic. However, the differences often arise from self-selection process, which 
are driven by unobserved traits of borrowers, such as ability. A simple evaluation of 
credit programme without calculating these attributions will be biased. 
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We use instrumental variable to identify the credit amount that household ob- 
tained. The variables of credit per capita at commune-level, distance from commune 
committee to the nearest government bank branch (in form of log-transformation 
and dummy) are employed as the instruments. Our results are consistent with other 
studies of the Vietnamese rural credit markets (e. g., Pham et al (2002)) that also find 
positive and significant effects of credit on borrower's consumption. In particular, 
we find in our panel analysis that 1 percent increase in average credit per capita bor- 
rowed from the formal sector leads to 0.26 percent increase in average consumption 
per capita. Controlling for selection biases has been shown to be very important. In 
our study, estimations using simple OLS regression lead us to conclusion of no effects 
of credit. This result is clearly underestimated the more reliable (positive) results 
in which biases have been carefully addressed. However, a reservation should be 
pointed out. That is our core instrumental variables are at commune-level. These 
are useful to control for intra-communal differences in formal credit accessibility 
but they do not allow controlling for inter-communal or household-level unobserved 
characteristics. Although this problem has been addressed by using household fixed- 
effects, and by cluster-robust test statistics and'standard errors, results might be 
different if other instrumental variables had been used. 
The results from this thesis imply some important policy implications. First, 
even though formal credit network continues to expand greatly to cover most rural 
areas, there is a question on the outreach and flexibility of credit services because ra- 
tioning remains as a serious problem for rural households. Credit institutions should 
develop a better screening system, e. g. credit scoring system, to reduce collateral 
requirement which actually considered as oneý of the most obstacles of the formal 
credit access. Land regulations and fixed asset legal entitlement should be reviewed 
together with improvement of administration procedure to enable households to use 
their property as collateral if required. 
Finally, the increased demand for credit implies more investment opportuni- 
ties. Hence, on one hand, government should continue to improve the economic 
infrastructure to facilitate agricultural product trade market, provide better health 
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and education system to maintain this demand. On the other hand, credit institu- 
tions should be encouraged to expand their services to distant and mountain areas. 
Formal lenders should not limit themselves to lending only for production purposes 
but should diversify to include consumption. 
In the future research, we should explore further the different development level 
across provinces in Vietnam which currently receives very little attention. In ad- 
dition, a study of the interaction between formal and informal sectors will make 
great contribution to the literature. Further work also required to fully explain 
credit behaviours of households who borrow from both sectors and credit behav- 
iours of households who come from different consumption quintiles. Currently, we 
still assume that loans from formal or informal lenders are homogeneous and lenders 
behave indifferently within its sector. This assumption is strong. We therefore may 
want to relax this assumption by studying household's credit from lenders rather 
than from sectors as we currently do. 
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Table A. 1: Vietnam's Economic Indicators - 1990-2000 
Figure A. 1: Share of Agriculture in total GDP, Employment and Export 
Year GDP growth (%) GDP per capita (USD) Exchange rate 
(VND/USD) 
1990 5.10 98 6,483 
1991 5.96 113 10,037 
1992 8.65 143 11,202 
1993 8.07 187 10,641 
1994 8.84 227 10,966 
1995 9.54 284 11,038 
1996 9.34 332 11,033 
1997 8.15 356 11,683 
1998 5.76 356 13,268 
1999 4.77 370 13,943 
2000 6.79 397 14,168 
Source: APEC Energy Statistics (2003) 
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Table A. 2: Mean characteristics of household and commune - VLSS1992/93 
Variable Pooled 
Non- 
borrowing 
household 
Borrowing household 
Total Formal Informal borrower borrower 
Male head of household (Male=l) 0.77 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.79 
(0.42) (0.43) (0.4) (0.39) (0.41) 
Age of household head 44.85 46.76 43.07 43.83 42.75 
(14.79) (15.49) (13.87) (13.54) (13.89) 
Marital status of head (Married - 1) 0.82 0.8 0.84 0.85 0.83 
(0.38) (0.4) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) 
Household size 4.97 4.7 5.23 5.35 5.22 
(2.12) (2.08) (2.12) (2.00) (2.16) 
Working adult number 2.68 2.64 2.71 2.83 2.67 
(1.26) (1.26) (1.27) (1.29) (1.26) 
Education level of household head 1.57 1.62 1.52 1.57 1.5 
(1.47) (1.56) (1.38) (1.33) (1.39) 
Work in agriculture (Yes=l) 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.84 
(0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) 
House ownership (Yes=l) 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
House area (m2) 61.85 64.29 59.6 63.14 57.68 
(32.76) (33.92) (31.48) (31.03) (30.93) 
House value (VND mil. ) 7.83 8.45 7.25 8.18 6.98 
(11.2) (11.92) (10.44) (12.21) (10.37) 
Annual-crop-land holding size (m2) 918.78 882.09 953.06 1145.32 898.42 
(1346.88) (1338.33) (1354,26) (1516.63) (1260.8) 
Household's annual expenditure (VND mil. ) 5.35 5.21 5.48 5.79 5.34 
(3.87) (3.94) (3.81) (4.04) (3.82) 
Expenditure per capita (VND mil. ) 1.12 1.16 1.07 1.1 1.05 
(0.71) (0.76) (0.65) (0.59) (0.65) 
Commune's nonfarm employment (Ycs=l) 0.46 
(0.5) 
Commune population ('000) 8.69 
(4.95) 
3839 1854' 1985a 798 b 15 10" 
N (48.291/6) (51.71%) (40.20%) (76.07%) 
Note: ') As percentage of the whole sample; ) As percentage of borrowing households only. Total percentage larger 
than 100% due to some households borrow from both formal and informal sectors; Education level ranging from 1-6 
including pre-school, primary school, lower secondary school, upper secondary school, vocational training, university; 
The land holding size is calculated basing on areas of land for agricultural production purpose only. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table A. 3: Mean characteristics of household and commune - VLSS1997/98 
Variable Pooled Non- Borrowing household 
borrowing 
household 
Total Formal Informal 
borrower borrower 
Male head of household (Male= 1) 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.82 0.81 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.39) (0.38) (0.4) 
Age of household head 47.29 49.97 45.07 45.54 44.64 
(13.84) (14.93) (12.43) (12.09) (12.81) 
Marrital status of head (Married - 1) 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.87 0.84 
(0.38) (0.42) (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) 
I lousehold size 4.87 4.51 5.17 5.3 5.06 
(1.94) (2.04) (1.8) (1.83) (1.74) 
Working adult number 2.84 2.76 2.89 2.98 2.83 
(1.27) (1.26) (1.27) (1.29) (1.25) 
Education level of household head 2.51 2.37 2.62 2.63 2.6 
(1.23) (1.32) (1.14) (1.11) (1.17) 
Years in school of household head 6.44 6.08 6.74 6.73 6.75 
(4.07) (4.28) (3.87) (3.81) (3.96) 
Work in agriculture (Yes-1) 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.73 
(0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.44) 
I-louse ownership (Yes--I) 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 
(0.17) (0.2) (0.14) (0.12) (0.17) 
House area (m2) 67.7 67.02 68.25 70.04 66.28 
(34.45) (37.02) (32.17) (32.98) (30.51) 
House value (VND mil. ) 23.84 24.18 23.57 23.29 23.58 
(31.33) (33.28) (29.62) (29.4) (28.53) 
Annual-crop-land holding size (m2) 2643.67 2449.81 2802.87 3079.61 2587.05 
(4773.54) (4592.43) (4914.29) (5335.11) (4371.64) 
Household's annual expenditure (VND mil. ) 11.09 10.69 11.42 11.82 10.93 
(7.38) (8.06) (6.75) (7.01) (6.32) 
Expenditure per capita (VND mil. ) 2.4 2.53 2.29 2.31 2.24 
(1.43) (1.67) (1.19) (1.19) (1.17) 
Commune's nonfarm employment (Yes=l) 0.55 
(0.5) 
Commune population ('000) 9.02 
(5.12) 
N 4269 1935' 2334' 1576 b 1192 b 
(45.31%) (54.69%) (67.52%) (53.35%) 
Note: *) As percentage of the whole sample; ) As percentage of borrowing households only, the total percentage larger 
than 100% due to some households borrow from both formal and informal sectors; Education level ranging from 1-6 
including pre-school, primary school, lower secondary school, upper secondary school, vocational training, university; 
The land holding size is calculated basing on areas of land for agricultural production purpose only. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. 
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Table AA: Characteristics of Borrowing Households by Credit Sectors 
Source of loan VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
Formal sector' 23.93 48.93 
- VBARD & VBP 65.91 81.98 
- Private banks 13.28 0.19 
- Cooperative 24.69 4.12 
- Other credit organisations 4.26 17.70 
Informal sector' 59.80 32.48 
- Money lenders 25.89 23.91 
- Relatives 57.22 50.25 
- ROSCA 2.01 
- Other individuals 29.21 35.07 
Both sectors' 16.27 18.59 
Overall in-debt householdS2 51.71 54.69 
Note: Numbers are in percentage. Numbers in bold are: ') percentages of total 
borrowing households; 2) percentages of total sample households. Numbers in sub- 
category are percentages of total borrowing households from the appropriate 
sector. 
110 
Table A. 5: Distribution of Borrowing Households by Region 
Region VLSS93 VLSS98 
Northern Uplands 
Red River Delta 
North Central Coast 
South Central Coast 
Highlands 
South East 
Mekong Delta 
Formal 
Borrower 
Informal 
Borrower 
All 
Borrower 
38.73 78.1 51.81 
38.11 79.16 46.39 
52.92 71.35 59.48 
33.16 74.74 49.48 
25.37 80.6 52.34 
40.88 66.42 42.81 
38.78 77.78 57.38 
Formal 
Borrower 
Informal 
Borrower 
All 
Borrower 
68.48 47.29 57.68 
53.13 69.01 49.04 
67.7 54.21 59.33 
69.84 38.62 37.65 
71.68 45.58 61.41 
72.43 44.52 58.56 
72.1 49.08 59.16 
Full sample 40.20 76.07 51.71 67.52 51.07 54.69 
N 798 1,510 1,985 1,576 1,192 2,334 
Note: Numbers are in percentages. Numbers in All Borrower column are percentages of borrowing household in each region 
regardless of credit sectors. Results are calculated within region, and finance source are calculated within borrowing 
household. Result for all region as contribution toward total borrowing households in the sample is not necessary as number 
of sample among region are also vary depending on their weight of population. 
ill 
Table A. 6: Distribution of Borrowing Households by Expenditure Quintiles and 
Credit Sectors 
% of full Per capita 
Expenditure per capi ta quintile sample exp. 
Low Low-mid Middle Up-mid Upper 
VLSS93 
- Formal borrower 18.36 21.48 22.27 21.48 20.34 20.79 1096.53 
- Informal borrower 46.22 42.58 38.93 36.59 32.33 39.33 1052.93 
- All borrower 55.86 54.3 51.56 49.87 46.94 51.71 1077.72 
- Per capita ýxp. 514.77 740.57 945.92 1231.47 2160.01 
VLSS98 
Formal borrower 38.29 37.47 40.05 33.72 35.05 36.92 2313.60 
Informal borrower 31.62 30.56 29.27 24.59 23.56 27.92 2244.45 
All borrower 58.55 56.51 58.67 50.12 49.59 54.69 2292.54 
Per capita exp. 1126.22 165Z 12 2077.45 2671.15 4467.59 
Note: Household per capita expenditure (number in italic) is measured in '000 VND. Other numbers are in 
percentages (borrowers). 
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Table A. 7: Distribution of Loan Number and Loan Amount by Expenditure per 
Capita Quintile 
Expenditure per capita quintile 
Low Low-mid Middle Up-mid Upper Total 
VLSS1992/93 
- Formal sector 17.67 20.68 21.43 20.68 19.55 100% 
(8.26) (10.95) (17.08) (23.19) (40.49) (100%) 
- Informal sector 23.51 21.66 19.80 18.61 16.42 100% 
(10.68) (12.94) (17.07) (17.47) (41.82) (100%) 
VLSS1997/98 
- Formal sector 20.75 20.30 21.70 18.27 18.97 100% 
(9.75) (13.62) (17.97) (19.09) (39.58) (100%) 
- Informal sector 22.65 21.90 20.97 17.62 16.86 100% 
(9.76) (12.62) (21.81) (21.81) (33.98) (100%) 
Note: Numbers are in percentages of loans and loan amount (in parentheses), by household per capital quintiles. 
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Table A. 8: Distribution of Borrowing Households by Employment of Household 
Head 
Employment VLSS93 VLSS98 
Pooled Borrowing household Pooled Borrowing households 
All Formal Informal All Formal Informal 
Agriculture 82.65 83.63 85.34 83.51 69.15 70.99 73.54 68.14 
Self-emp 10.97 10.73 10.15 10.86 10.52 10.93 9.71 12.25 
Paid-emp 5.05 4.69 3.51 4.64 11.78 12.13 11.10 13.09 
Unemp 1.33 0.96 1.00 0.99 8.55 5.96 5.65 6.63 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 3,839 1,985 798 1,510 4,269 2,334 1,576 1,192 
Note: Numbers are in percentages. 
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Table A. 9: Loan Characteristics - VLSS1992/93 
Variable Loan number Loan size Loan duration Interest rate Collateral 
('000 VND) (month) M 
Formal sector 29.05 906.52 8.81 45.98 50.60 (31.33) 
(1904.06) (13.92) (8.77) 
- VBARD & VBP 60.04 1092.63 6.64 42.73 75.99 
(2224.47) (6.97) 
- Private banks 13.25 919.78 9.84 59.41 5.61 
(1485.75) (10.07) 
- Cooperative 22.63 418.42 14.37 41.01 17.23 
(973.9) (25.62) 
- Other credit 4.08 831.73 30.3 77.73 8.12 
organisations (1394.91) (31.54) 
Informal sector 70.95 820.04 10.67 91.93 5.37 
(2203.12) (13.05) (17.46) (4.86) 
- Money lenders 22.91 1211.11 8.23 109.39 11.21 
(3756.2) (9.47) 
- Relatives 51.33 726.59 13.43 74.93 0.67 
(1385.5) (16.31) 
- Other individuals 25.76 658.46 8.77 110.28 9.54 
(1520.92) (8.89) 
Note: Loan number (in bold) is percentage of total loans. Loan size is in '000 VND. Loan duration is in month. Interest rate 
ELr 
is mean of annual interest rate (%), weighted by loan amount from the same lenders- F -- , Collateral is the ZT * 
percentage of collateralised loans amount. Numbers in sub-catcgory are percentage within the sector. Standard deviation in 
parentheses 
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Table A. 10: Loan Characteristics - VLSS1997/98 
Variable Loan number Loan value Loan duration Interest rate Collateral 
('000 VND) (month) (% annual) M) 
Formal source 49.70 3638.13 18.40 14.97 74.61 
(5273.02) (17.42) (1.52) (25.61) 
- VBARD & VBP 78.16 4149.69 17.75 15.29 87.05 
(5741.94) (15.40) 
- Private banks 0.17 1900.00 14.55 18.4 78.95 
(964.37) (13.43) 
- Cooperative 3.96 3095.38 17.93 20.08 74.94 
(3392.72) (47.05) 
- Other credit 17.72 1518.7 24.85 12.37 19.65 
organisations (1798.02) (17.82) 
Informal source 50.30 2348.27 9.58 37.91 3.74 
(5942.11) (14.12) (9.15) (5.15) 
- Money lenders 20.97 2761.23 9.53 49.67 13.51 
(4798.27) (19.44) 
- Relatives 46.06 2164.33 11.11 30.66 0.13 
(3471.82) (8.86) 
- ROSCA 1.32 1577.04 20.27 85.89 0.00 
(1528.66) (22.51) 
- Other individuals 31.65 2374.59 7.64 38.67 2.67 
(8867.31) (6.79) 
Note: Loan number (in bold) is percentage of total loans. Loan size is in '000 VND. Loan duration is in month. Interest rate 
Lr 1: 
is mean of annual interest rate (%), weighted by loan amount from the same lenders-. F -- '' Collateral is the ý T, * 
percentage of collateralised loans amount. Numbers in sub-category are percentage within the sector. Standard deviation in 
parentheses 
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Table A. 11: Collateral assets 
Variable VLSS1997/98 
Land House Furniture/ Others Total 
Fixed-assets 
Formal source 58.59 31.64 4.77 5.00 100% 
- Bank for the poor 44.81 42.21 10.39 2.60 
- Other government banks 62.20 27.87 4.05 5.88 
- Private banks 100.00 - - - 
- Other credit organisations 45.31 50.00 3.91 0.78 
Informal source 8.02 90.38 1.60 100% 
- Money lenders 29.17 68.75 2.08 
- Relatives 3.77 95.60 0.63 
- ROSCA - - 
- Other individuals 4.95 92.08 2.97 
Note: Numbers are in percentage of collateralised loan number. In sub-category is the percentage within credit sectors. 
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Table A. 12: Borrowing Purposes 
Variable VLSS93 VLSS98 
Investment Consumption Repay/ Investment Consumption Repay/ 
Relend Relend 
Formal Sector 71.63 28.37 80.45 17.44 2.12 
- VBARD & VBP 87.13 12.87 82.68 14.94 2.53 
- Private banks 49.17 50.83 100 - - 
- Cooperative 47.80 52.20 60.56 39.44 - 
- Other credit 48.65 51.35 - 74.84 23.58 1.57 
organisations 
Informal Sector 43.45 56.32 . 23 41.50 54.38 4.13 
- Money lenders 59.83 39.49 . 68 62.20 33.07 4.72 
- Relatives 37.57 62.36 . 07 27.84 68.10 4.06 
- ROSCA - 37.50 50.00 12.50 
- Other individuals 41.09 58.77 . 14 47.83 48.70 3.48 
Note: Loan for consumption includes loan to build or buy house, consumer durables, general consumption on food and non- 
schooling and others. Investment consists loan for working capital and basic investment. All numbers are in percentage ot 
numbers from the same source of credit. 
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Table A. 13: Borrowing Lenders 
Source of loan VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
Borrowing Other borrowers Borrowing Other borrowers 
lenders lenders 
Formal sector 41.90 39.88 63.16 68.22 
- VBARD & VBP 74.24 64.26 83.82 81.71 
- Private banks 9.09 14.11 0.00 0.22 
- Cooperative 18.18 25.98 3.43 4.23 
- Other credit organisations 7.58 3.60 18.14 17.64 
inrormal sector 58.10 60.12 36.84 31.78 
- Money lenders 19.23 27.12 15.68 25.42 
- Relatives 52.99 57.99 56.76 49.06 
- ROSCA - 5.95 1.29 
- Other individuals 39.32 27.35 34.59 35.15 
Notes: Borrowing lenders are households that borrow and lend simultaneously. Other borrowers include 
households that borrow but do not lend money. Numbers are in percentages. 
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Table B. 1: Estimation Results: Univariate Probit Model (Model I) 
Independent variables 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Borrowing by Credit Sector 
Formal Sector Informal Sector 
1992/93 1997/98 1992/93 1997/98 
GENDER 0.129 0.02 0.022 0.095 
(0.081) (0.078) (0.072) (0.081) 
AGE 0.016 0.029 -0.012 -0.017 
(0.011) (0.013)** (0.011) (0.015) 
AGESQR -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.000 0.000 
(0.0001)* (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
MARITS -0.078 0.069 -0.15 -0.134 
(0.093) (0.089) (0.075)* (0.084) 
IIIISIZE 0.052 0.087 0.061 0.049 
(0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** 
HIIADULT 0.196 0.334 0.071 0.194 
(0.104)* (0.089)*** (0.088) (0.095)** 
EDULEVEL 0.01 0.031 -0.022 -0.042 
(0.02) (0.027) (0.019) (0.035) 
EDUYEAR 0.042 0.008 
(0.023)* (0.027) 
EDUYEARSQR -0.003 0.001 
(0.001)*** (0.001) 
FARM 0.073 0.158 0.048 -0.062 
(0.071) (0.059)*** (0.063) (0.06) 
HOUSE 0.16 0.34 0.215 0.048 
(0.182) (0.148)** (0.124)* (0.133) 
LAND 0.098 0.011 -0.019 -0.007 
(0.027)*** (0.007)* (0.027) (0.007) 
POP 0.012 0.005 -0.001 0.014 
(0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.011) 
HEALTH 0.01 0.001 0.008 0.015 
(0.003)*** (0.004) (0.003)** (0.003)*** 
CAP 0.125 0.029 -0.013 -0.012 
(0.051)'* (0.006)*** (0.03) (0.007)* 
DISTI 0.192 -0.001 
(0.088)** (0.112) 
DIST2 0.069 -0.016 
(0.087) (0.11) 
_cons -2.093 -2.53 -0.165 -0.223 (0.289)*** 0.355 (0.271) (0.356) 
Pr(participation) 0.2067 0.3710 0.3931 0.2791 
Log Likelihood -1875.96 -2534.30 -2518.66 -2384.60 
Akaik-e Criterion 3779.92 5104.60 5065.331 4805.20 
N 3839 4143 3839 4143 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and adjusted for commune clustering. and 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table B. 2: Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model 
Independent variables 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Borrowing by Credit Sector 
VLSS 1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
Formal Sector Informal Sector * Formal Sector Informal Sector 
GENDER 0.129 0.022 0.02 0.095 
(0.081) (0.072) (0.078) (0.081) 
AGE 0.016 -0.012 0.029 -0.017 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)** (0.015) 
AGESQR -0.0002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.0001)* (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
MARITS -0.078 -0.15 0.069 -0.134 
(0.093) (0.075)* (0.089) (0.084) 
HHSIZE 0.052 0.061 0.087 0.049 
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
HHADULT 0.196 0.071 0.334 0.194 
(0.104)* (0.088) (0.089)*** (0.095)** 
EDULEVEL 0.01 -0.022 0.031 -0.042 
(0.02) (0.019) (0.027) (0.035) 
EDUYEAR 0.042 0.008 
(0.023)* (0.027) 
EDUYEARSQR -0.003 0.001 
(0.001)*** (0.001) 
FARM 0.073 0.048 0.158 -0.062 
(0.071) (0.063) (0.059)*** (0.06) 
HOUSE 0.16 0.215 0.34 0.048 
(0.182) (0.124)* (0.148)** (0.133) 
LAND 0.098 -0.019 0.011 -0.007 
(0.027)*** (0.027) (0.007)* (0.007) 
POP 0.012 -0.001 0.00S 0.014 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.007) (0.011) 
HEALTH 0.01 0.008 0.001 0.015 
(0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.004) (0.003)*** 
CAP 0.125 -0.013 0.029 -0.012 
(0.051)** (0.03) (0.006)*** (0.007)* 
DISTI 0.192 -0.001 
(0.088)** (0.112) 
DIST2 0.069 -0.016 
(0.087) (0.11) 
_cons -2.093 -0.165 -2.53 -0.223 (0.289)*** (0.271) 0.355 (0.356) 
Log Likelihood 4394.61 4918.73 
rho . 0053 -. 
0159 
Wald test (Ho: rho=O) p-val 0.8871 0.6583 
N 3839 4143 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and adjusted for commune clustering. and 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table B. 3: Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model with Partial Observability 
(Model II) of Formal Sector in 1992/93 
Variable Demand Supply 
Coefficient Std. Err. Cocfficient Std. Err. 
GENDER 0.1285 0.1283 -0.0912 0.1925 
AGE 0.0083 0.0201 0.0187 0.0309 
AGESQR -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 
MARITS -0.1437 0.1442 0.2182 0.2234 
HHSIZE 0.088 0.0238*** -0.0794 0.033* 
HHADULT 0.3643 0.2016* -0.3529 0.3191 
EDULEVEL 0.0571 0.0347 -0.0779 0.0504 
FARM 0.1091 0.1141 -0.1708 0.1778 
HOUSE 0.0535 0.267 0.0204 0.3908 
LAND 0.1627 0.0294*** -0.0921 0.0372** 
POP 0.0143 0.0098 0.018 0.0184 
HEALTH 0.0121 0.0035*** 
CAP 
_cons -1.5168 
1.6978 0.3849*** 
0.4906*** 0.1039 0.971 
Pr(Demand) . 3963 . 
1230 
Pr(Supply) . 7600 . 
1930 
Pr(SupplyIDemand) . 5261 . 
3288 
rho -. 8392 
LR test (HO: rho--O) p-val 0.0170 
Log likelihood -1712.36 
Akaike criterion 3478.72 
N 3839 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and adjusted for commune clustering. and 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table BA: Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model with Partial Observability 
(Model II) of Formal Sector in 1997/98 
Variable Demand Supply 
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
GENDER 0.0735 0.116 -0.0268 0.2038 
AGE 0.0444 0.0183** -0.0244 0.0324 
AGESQR -0.0005 0.0002*** 0.0003 0.0003 
MARITS -0.0126 0.1371 0.0819 0.2485 
HHSIZE 0.1139 0.0217*** -0.0849 0.035** 
HHADULT 0.4355 0.1975 ** -0.2892 0.345 
EDUYEAR 0.0915 0.0282*** -0.0667 0.0469 
EDUYEARSQR -0.0052 0.0019*** 0.0037 0.0031 
FARM 0.3059 0.0796*** -0.2615 0.1284* 
LAND -0.0041 0.0067 0.0399 0.0235** 
POP 0.0063 0.007 0.0124 0.0114 
HEALTH 0.0005 0.0034 
CAP 0.2426 0.0356*** 
DISTI 
DIST2 
_ýcons 
0.2023 
0.0345 
-2.3247 
0.0857** 0.0233 0.1411 
0.0858 -0.0697 0.145** 
0.4209*** 1.326 0.7156* 
Pr(Demand) 0.5113 0.1494 
Pr(Supply) 0.8602 0.1420 
Pr(SupplyiDemand) 0.7230 0.2651 
rho -0.8965 
LR test (HO: rho=O) p-val 0.0022 
Log likelihood -2450.53 
Akaikc criterion 4963.07 
N 4143 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and adjusted for commune clustering. and 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table B. 5: Estimation Results: Bivariate Probit Model with Partial Observability 
(Model II) of Informal Sector in 1997/98 
Variable Demand Supply 
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
GENDER 0.0096 0.0982 0.4021 0.3222 
AGE -0.0313 0.0149* 0.0279 0.0544 
AGESQR 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 
MARITS -0.0966 0.105 -0.1714 0.3772 
HHSIZE 0.0846 0.0209*** . 0.2246 0.0777*** 
HHADULT 0.0675 0.1269 0.0947 0.6047* 
EDUYEAR -0.0109 0.0082 0.0348 0.0277 
FARM -0.0857 0.0689 -0.016 0.2837 
LAND 0.0041 0.0069 -0.0302 0.0185 
POP 0.0953 0.0489** 
HEALTH 0.0078 0.0047* 0.1366 0.0977 
Predicted Formal Access -0.6509 0.1551*** 
_cons 
0.9173 0.3888 0.3984 1.355 
Pr(Demand) . 3209 . 0993 
Pr(supply) . 9565 . 0695 
Pr(SupplyIDemand) . 8872 . 
1565 
rho -. 9346 
LR test (HO: rho=O) p-val 0.2327 
Log likelihood -2365.90 
Akaike criterion 4781.80 
N 4143 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and adjusted for commune clustering. and 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Figure C-t: Distribution of the credit aniount, obtained In level and in logarithili 
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Table CA: Estimation Results: OLS 
Dependent Variable: Ln(I +Credit Amount) 
Independent variables VLSS1992/93 VLSS 1997/98 
Formal Sector Informal Sector Formal Sector Informal Sector 
GENDER 0.245 0.02 0.081 0.217 
(0.123)** (0.175) (0.194) (0.196) 
AGE 0.029 -0.023 0.087 -0.055 
(0.017)* (0.023) (0.03)*** (0.033)* 
AGESQR -0.0003 -0.00004 -0.001 0.0002 
(0.0002)** (0.0002) (0.0002)*** (0.0003) 
MARITS -0.097 -0.226 0.187 -0.307 
(0.143) (0.173) (0.222) (0.207) 
HIISIZE 0.11 0.189 0.203 0.136 
(0.024)*** (0.028)*** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
HHADULT 0.291 0.135 0.628 0.485 
(0.167)* (0.201) (0.21)*** (0.209)** 
EDULEVEL 0.035 -0.012 0.057 -0.067 
(0.029) (0.043) (0.071) (0.086) 
EDUYEAR 0.15 0.016 
(0.057)*** (0.062) 
EDUYEARSQR -0.009 0.002 
(0.003)*** (0.003) 
FARM 0.028 0.043 0.463 -0.194 
(0.106) (0.154) (0.159)*** (0.168) 
HOUSE 0.225 0.563 0.902 0.08 
(0.234) (0.242)** (0.332)*** (0.301) 
HEALTH 0.016 0.013 0.000 0.036 
(0-006)*** (0.008)*** (0.011) (0.008)*** 
LNLAND 0.413 -0.114 0.259 -0.008 
(0.109)*** (0.147) (0.104)** (0.117) 
LNPOP 0.535 0.311 0.812 0.536 
(0.156)*** (0.236) (0.173)*** (0.27)** 
LNCAP 1.551 0.128 1.541 -0.145 
(0.228)*** (0.25) (0.093)*** (0.164) 
DISTI 0.268 -0.027 
(0.129)** (0.123) 
DIST2 0.106 -0.074 
(0.112) (0.204) 
_cons -2.538 
1.436 -5.855 1.825 
(0.582)*** (0.828)* (0.791)*** (0.853)** 
R-square 0.0984 0.0342 0.1429 0.0337 
N 3839 3839 4143 4143 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and adjusted for clustering at commune level. and 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table C. 2: Estimation Results: the Tobit model 
Dependent Variable: Ln(I+Credit Amount) 
Independent variables VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
Formal Sector Informal Sector Formal Sector Informal Sector 
GENDER 0.938 0.089 0,137 0.74 
(0.624) (0.412) (0.515) (0.653) 
AGE 0.145 -0.058 0.266 -0,161 
(0.095) (0.062) (0.089)*** (0.106) 
AGESQR -0.002 -0.0002 -0.003 0.000 
(0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001) 
MARITS -0.352 -0.768 0.62 -1.137 
(0.703) (0.467)* (0.59) (0.735) 
HHSIZE 0.461 0,432' 0.537 0.483 
(0.103)*** (0.069)*** (0.087)*** (0.112)*** 
HHADULT 1.613 0.544 2.342 1.954 
(0.918)* (0.603) (0.712)*** (0.879)** 
EDULEVEL 0.101 -0.09 0.167 -0.312 
(0.141) (0.092) (0.198) (0.252) 
EDUYEAR 0.416 0.046 
(0.146)*** (0.182) 
EDUYEARSQR -0.027 0.007 
(0.008)*** (0.01) 
FARM 0.482 0.171 1.087 -0.651 
(0.529) (0.345) (0.37)*** (0.454) 
HOUSE 1.314 1.463 3.042 0.449 
(1.184) (0.751)* (0.993)*** (1.091) 
HEALTH 0.086 0.043 0.008 0.136 
(0.026)*** (0.018)** (0.026) (0.031)*** 
LNLAND 2.268 -0.145 0.749 -0.035 
(0.33)*** (0.224) (0.19)*** (0.25) 
LNPOP 2.546 0.413 1.824 1.663 
(0.428)*** (0.271)** (0.343)*** (0.43)*** 
LNCAP 6.538 0.146 3.753 -0.763 
(0.429)*** (0.275) (0.207)*** (0.25)*** 
DISTI 0.777 0.008 
(0.317)** (0.399) 
DIST2 0.358 -0.163 
(0.317) (0.394) 
_cons -18.742 -2.454 -27.954 -3.145 (2.626)*** (1.62) (2.514)*** (2.132) 
Log likelihood -3695.64 -6449.92 -6452.41 -5382.18 
N 3839 3839 4143 4143 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
129 
Table C. 3: Estimation Results: Heckman Selection Model for the Formal Sector 
Credit Amount Obtained 
Independent variables VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
Selection Credit Amount Selection Credit Amount 
GENDER 0.118 0.16 0.032 0.076 
(0.079) (0.14) (0.073) (0.229) 
AGE 0,018 0.028 0.035 0.107 
(0.012) (0.02) (0.013)*** (0.058)* 
AGESQR -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 
(0.000)* (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.001)* 
MARITS -0.061 0.085 0.06 0.265 
(0.09) (0.145) (0.083) (0.276) 
HHSIZE 0.053 -0.016 0.073 0.016 
(0.013)*** (0.032) (0.013)*** (0.096) 
HHADULT 0.178 0.67 0.297 0.838 
(0.116) (0.215)*** (0.101)*** (0.501)* 
EDULEVEL 0.01 0.081 0.029 0.046 
(0.018) (0.031)*** (0.028) (0.093) 
EDUYEAR 0.054 0.113 
(0.021)** (0.092) 
EDUYEARSQR -0.004 -0.006 
(0.001)*** (0.006) 
FARM 0.07 -0.248 0.164 0.24 
(0.068) (0.116)** (0.053) (0.253) 
HOUSE 0.153 0.338 0.359 1.257 
(0: 149) (0.27) (0.137)*** (0.669)* 
LNLAND 0.299 0.045 0.106 0.257 
(0.042)*** (0.152) (0.028)*** (0.15 1)* 
LNPOP 0.279 0.945 0.168 1.265 
(0.054)*** (0.152)*** (0.049)*** (0.249)*** 
LNCAP 0.785 1.472 0.484 1.703 
(0.051)*** (0.35)*** (0.029)*** (0.578)*** 
IIEALT11 0.011 0.001 
(0.003)*** (0.004) 
DISTI 0.161 0.123 
(0.057)*** (0.255) 
DIST2 0.088 -0.017 
(0.056) (0.204) 
. ýcons -2.986 -0.973 -3.703 -8.21 (0.321)*** (1.821) (0.339)*** (6.049) 
Lamda 0.963 s. e. 0.598* 3.12 s. e. 1.79* 
rho 0.757 1.00 
N 3839 4143 
Note: Dependent variable is LNPCCRF. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table CA: Estimation Results: Double Hurdle Selection Model for the Formal Sector 
Credit Amount Obtained 
Independent variables VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
Selection Credit Amount Selection Credit Amount 
GENDER 0.118 0.109 0.036 0.023 
(0.079) (0.121) (0.073) (0.079) 
AGE 0.018 0.023 0.035 0.044 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013)*** (0.014)*** 
AGESQR -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 
(0.0001)* (0.0002) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
MARITS -0.063 0.107 0.056 0.135 
(0.09) (0.131) (0.083) (0.093) 
HHSIZE 0.053 -0.037 0.075 -0.114 
(0.013)*** (0.023) (0.013)*** (0.015)*** 
HH,, kDULT 0.178 0.589 0.29 0.27 
(0.116) (0.186)*** (0.101)*** (0.121)** 
EDULEVEL 0.009 0.079 0.028 -0.001 
(0.018) (0.029)*** (0.028) (0.03) 
EDUYEAR 0.055 0.017 
(0.021)*** (0.023) 
EDUYEARSQR -0.004 0.0003 
(0.001)*** (0.001) 
FARM 0.068 -0.277 0.162 -0.051 
(0.068) (0.103)*** (0.053)*** (0.059) 
HOUSE 0.154 0.258 0.365 0.511 
(0.149) (0.241) (0.137)*** (0.177)*** 
LNLAND 0.3 -0.085 0.104 0.069 
(0.042)*** (0.084) (0.028)*** (0.029)** 
LNPOP 0.281 0.832 0.178 0.964 
(0.054)*** (0.098)*** (0.049)*** (0.052)*** 
LNCAP 0.789 1.154 0.49 0.852 
(0.052)*** (0.162)*** (0.03)*** (0.052)*** 
HEALTH 0.012 0.003 
(0.003)*** (0.004) 
DISTI 0.163 -0.18 
(0.057)*** (0.06) 
DIST2 0.09 0.728 
(0.056) (0.577) 
. _: cons -2.992 
0.648 -3.758 -0.158 
(0.321)*** (0.886) (0.34)*** (0.06) 
Likelihood ratio -2896.90 4346.56 
rho 0.3946 0.4443 
Wald test (Ho: rho=O) p-val 0.1089 0.0049 
N 3839 4143 
Note: Dependent variable is LNPCCRF. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
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Table D. 1: Estimation Results: Impacts of Formal Credit - OLS and OLS-FE esti- 
mates 
Log per capita expenditure VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
LNPCCRF 0.007 0.01 -0.002 0.001 
(0.005) (0.004)*** (0.002) (0.002) 
GENDER 0.012 0.011 -0.05 -0.048 
(0.027) (0.023) (0.028)** (0.022)** 
AGE 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.013 
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
MARITS 0.106 0.114 0.074 0.076 
(0.031)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.024)** 
IIHSIZE -0.044 -0.057 -0.081 -0.079 
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** 
HHADULT 0.308 0.236 0.219 0.18 
(0.037)*** (0.032)*** (0.035)*** (0.028)*** 
EDULEVEL 0.049 0.054 0.037 0.039 
(0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** 
EDUYEAR 0.041 0.03 
(0.01)*** (0.006)*** 
EDUYEARSQR -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001)*** (0.0003)** 
FARM -0.238 -0.165 -0.166 -0.07 
(0.028)*** (0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.017)*** 
HOUSE 0.113 0.103 -0.041 -0.005 
(0.041)*** (0.038)*** (0.055) (0.038) 
HEALTH 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LNLAND -0.057 0.082 0.052 0.065 
(0.03)* (0.022)*** (0.018)*** (0.011)*** 
LNPOP 0.311 0.312 
(0.042)*** (0.038)*** 
LNCAP 0.161 0.144 
(0.043)*** (0.024)*** 
DISTI -0.014 
(0.032) 
DIST2 0.045 
(0.057) 
_cons 
5.742 6.46 6.165 7.154 
(0.145)*** (0.077)*** (0.153)*** (0.078)*** 
R-squared 0.2499 0.1043 0.3214 0.2052 
N 3839 3839 4143 4143 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of real expenditure per capita adjusted by price indexes of regions and 
months; Variable of interest (LNPCCRF) is the log of (one plus) household per capita formal credit amount 
obtained; Regression (1,2) & (3,4) are estimated using full samle data from the VLSS1992/93 and 
VLSS1997/98, respectively. Regression 2&4 introd uce commune fixed-effect. Figures in brackets are 
standard errors which are robust and adjusted for clustering on communes (in regression I & 3). R-squared 
in the FE regressions is the overall R-squared. and indicate significance at the 1 0%, 5%, and I% 
level 
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Table D. 2: Estimation Results: Impacts of Formal Credit - Instrumental Vaxiable 
Estimates on Cross-Sectional Data 
Log per capita expenditure VLSS1992/93 VLSS1997/98 
IV IV IV IV IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LNPCCRF 0.142 0.11 0.112 0.11 0.11 
(0.041)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)*** 
GENDER -0.017 -0.063 -0.063 -0.063 -0.058 
(0.03) (0.034)* (0.034)* (0.034)* (0.033)* 
AGE 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
MARITS 0.118 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.059 
(0.033)*** (0.033)* (0.033)* (0.033)* (0.032)* 
IIHSIZE -0,049 -0.091 -0.091 -0.091 -0,091 
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
HHADULT 0.284 0.162 0.16 0.161 0.154 
(0.04)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** 
EDULEVEL 0.047 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.033 
(0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** 
EDUYEAR 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.026 
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)** 
EDUYEARSQR -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FARM -0.238 -0.209 -0.209 -0.209 -0.206 
(0.031)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** 
HOUSE 0.094 -0.132 -0.133 -0.132 -0.123 
(0.048)** (0.077)* (0.077)* (0.077)* (0.076) 
HEALTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
LNLAND -0.097 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.027 
(0.031)*** (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
LNPOP 0.255 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.23 
(0.042)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.038)*** 
_cons 
6.069 6.782 6.781 6.782 6.818 
(0.124)*** (0.14)*** (0.14)*** (0.14)*** (0.139)*** 
Robust first-stage F-stat 50.44 119.29 160.07 148.76 300.10 
Hansen J-stat (P-val) 0.00 1.506 (0.47) 0.054(0.81) 1.194(0.27) 0.00 
Endog test Chi-2 (P-val) 8.513(0.00) 20.06(0.00) 21.20(0.00) 20.41(0.00) 21.13(0.00) 
LR IV redundancy test 3.62(0.16) 0.435(0.50) 3.142(0.07) 
N 3839 4143 4143 4143 4143 
Note: Instrumental variable for regression (1) is LNCAP using VLSS1992/93; Regression 2-5 using 
VLSS1997/98. Instrumental variables in these regression are: IV(2): LNCAP, DISTI, and DIST2; IV(3): 
LNCAP, DISTI; IV(4): LNCAP, DIST2; IV(5): LNCAP. LNCAP instrument is significant at I percent level 
in all first-stage regressions, DISTI & DISTI become insignificant at 10 percent level and F-stat is really 
small (0.94) in the first-stage regression when LNCAP is dropped. lience result from that regression is not 
reported here. Redundancy test in IV(2) is for DISTI and DIST2; IV(3) is for DISTI; IV(4) for DIST2. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses which are heteroskedastic-robust and adjusted for clustering on 
commune. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
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Table D. 3: Estimation Results: Impacts of Formal Credit - Instrumental Variable 
Estimates on Longitudinal Data 
Log per capita OLS IV IV-G. NI. NI IV IV-GNI. Nt IV-GNINl 
cipenditure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1997/98) 
LNTCCRF93 0.006 0.095 0.07 0,089 0.054 0.113 
(0,006) (0.04)" (0.037)* (0.04)00 (0.039)* (0.042)*** 
GENDER98 -0,055 -0.073 -0.064 -0.072 -0.065 -0.077 
(0.029)0 (0.03)** (0.029)0* (0.03)" (0.03)** (0.031)** 
AGE99 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.007 
(0,001). 's (0.001)00* (0.001)*** (0.001)000 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
NIARITS99 0.064 0.097 0.092 0.085 0.086 0.092 
(0.0226)00 (0,028)4*0 (0.027)*** (0.029)$00 (0.029)*** (0.03)*** 
1 If ISIZE99 -0.067 -0.071 -0.073 -0.071 -0.075 -0-072 
(0.007)*** (0.007)"0 (0.006)0*0 (0-007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
111 IADULT99 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.2n 0.223 0.212 
(0.038)000 (0,044)000 (0.043)*$* (0.044)**4 (0.044)**$ (0.045)*** 
EDULEVEL99 0.049 0.046 0.042 0.046 0.044 0.046 
(0-0100 04 (0-011)*** (0-01 )"** (0-011)*** (0-011)"0 (0.012)0*0 
MUYM98 0.027 0.021 0.02 0.022 0.016 0.02 
(0,011). 0 (0.011). (0.011)0 (0.0 11)* (0.011) (0.012)0 
EDUYEARSQR98 -0,001 -0.001 0,0(* -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FAM199 -0.163 -0.168 -0.155 -0.168 -0,134 -0.17 
(0.033)0*0 (0.033)4*0 (0.031)0** (0-033)*** (0.032)0** (0.034)-*0 
1 IOUSE98 -0,003 -0,044 -0.045 -0-042 -0.019 -0-052 
(0.049) (0.055) (0,053) (0-055) (0.055) (0-057) 
1 IEALTI 198 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.002) (Oml) (0.002) (0.001) (0-002) 
LNLAND98 0.045 0.024 0.034 0.025 0.042 0.02 
(0.023)* (0,025) (0,023) (0.025) (0.024)0 (0-025) 
LNPOP98 0.207 0.201 0,206 0.201 0.184 0.2 
(0.04)*** (0. (43)*** (0.042)*** (0-042)*** (0.042)"0 (0.044)'0** 
cons 6.78 6.943 6.829 6.838 6.878 6.855 
(0.129)'" (0,130000 (0-129)*** (0.131)*** (0.131)*** (0.133)0** 
Robwt fifst-slage F-stat 9.77 9.77 18.32 18.32 44.32 
1 lansen J-stat (P. val) 26.12(0.00) 26.12(0.00) 17.70(0.00) 17.70(0.00) 0.00 
Endog test Chi-2 (P. val) 1.34(0.24) 1.34(0.24) 0.52(0.47) 0.52(0.47) 6.96(0.00) 
N 3364 3364 3364 3364 3364 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of real per capita consumption in 1997/98. The variable of interest is log 
of (one plus) per capita formal credit amount in 1992/93. Regression (1) is estimated by OLS. Regression (2) 
is estimated by two-stage methods using 6 instruments for the credit variable: IHISIZE93, IHIADULT93, 
I IEALT1 193. LNLAND93, LNPOP93. and LNCAF93; Regression (4) keeps 3 strongest instruments used in 
(2), basing on the t-stat in the fust-stage regression of (2), including IIEALTII93, LNLAND93, LNCAP93. 
Regression (6) keeps only LNCAP93 as the instrument. Regression (3). (5) employ GMM estimation to 
improve cfficicncy using the same rcgressors and instruments as in (2) & (4), respectively. Regression (6) is 
exactly identified hcnce GNIM and IV 2SLS estimators concidc. 
As before. standard errors are reported in parentheses which are heteroskcdastic-robust and adjusted for 
clustering on commune. 0. $0, and 06$ indicate significance at the 10*/*, 541s, and 1% level. 
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Table DA: Estimation Results: Impacts of Formal Credit - Household Fixed-Effect 
Estimates 
Log per capita expenditure FE IV-FE 
(1) (2) 
LN`PCCRF 0.025 0.263 
(0.003)*** (0.015)*** 
GENDER 0.000 0.14 
(0.052) (0.077)* 
AGE 0.015 0.012 
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
MARITS -0.032 -0.148 
(0.051) (0.076)* 
IHISIZE -0.093 -0.094 
(0.008)*** (0.012)*** 
HHADULT 0.034 -0.054 
(0.051) (0.072) 
EDULEVEL 0.171 0.088 
(0.007)*** (0.01)*** 
FARM . 0.189 -0.093 
(0.025)*** (0.041)** 
HOUSE -0.082 -0.095 
(0.069) (0.091) 
HEALTH 0.002 0.001 
(0.001)* (0.002) 
LNLAND 0.114 -0.003 
(0.01)*** (0.02) 
LNPOP 0.322 0.354 
(0.055)*** (0.083 
R-squared 0.4841 0.3839 
Robust first-stage F-stat 439.49 
Hansen J-stat (P-val) 0.00 
Endog test Chi-2 (P-val) 445.56(0.00) 
N 3364 3364 
Note: Dependent variable is difference in log of real per capita consumption between 
1997/98 and 1992/93. The variable of interest is difference in log of (one plus) per capita 
formal credit amount. Intrumental variable is difference in log of (one plus) commune 
credit per capita. Other regrcssors are also in difference. Standard errors in parentheses 
are heteroskedastic-robust. and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. 
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Appendix E 
VLSS Data Definition 
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Dependent Variables 
Credit 
CR Dummy of credit participation regardless of source of credit- CR equals 
I if household borrows 
CRF Dummy of formal credit participation. CRF equals I if household 
borrows from a formal source of credit 
CRI Dummy of informal credit participation. CRI equals I if household 
borrows from an informal source of credit 
ACR; ACRF; ACRI Variables of credit amount obtained by borrowing household from any 
source; formal source; and informal source, respectively. Unit: '000 VND 
PCCRF; PCCRI Variables of credit amount per household member from formal source; 
and informal source, respectively. Unit: '000 VND 
PCCRF=ACRF/HIISIZE; PCCRI=ACRI/HHSIZE 
LNPCCRF log(I+PCCRF) 
LNPCCRI log(I+PCCRI) 
Expenditure 
PCEXP Expenditure per capita of survey household readjusted by price indexes 
of regions and months (VLSS 1992/93: Jannuary 1993= 1; VLSS 1997/98: 
Jannuary 1998=1). This variable equals total expenditure including 
consumption of food and non-foodstuffs divided to household size. It is 
comparable between the two surveys. 
LNPCEXP log(I+PCEXP) 
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Independent Variables 
GENDER Gender of household head 
AGE Age of household head 
AGESQR Square value of age of household head 
MARITS Dummy indicating whether household head is married 
IIHSIZE I lousehold size - number of household members 
IIIIADULT Ratio of number of working adults (age 16-60) and household size 
EDULEVEL Education level of household head; Value ranges from 1-6 including 
pre-school, primary school, lower secondary school, upper secondary 
school, vocational training, university, respectively. 
EDUYEAR Number of schooling year of household head 
EDUYEARSQR EDUYEAR squared 
FARM Dummy indicating whether household work in agricultural production 
HOUSE Dummy indicating whether household owns the house 
HEALTH Total number of illness days of household head and his/her spouse 
LAND Area of irrigated land holding size; Unit: m2 
LNLAND Ln(I+Land) 
POP Commune's population; Unit: 1000 people 
LNPOP Ln(I+POP) 
Total amount of formal credit borrowed by commune's households 
CAP divided by commune's population 
LNCAP Ln(I+CAP) 
Distance from commune's committee to the nearest government's bank 
DISTANCE branch 
DISTI Dummy for DISTANCE [0-<4km] 
DIST2 Dummy for DISTANCE [4-< 1 Okm] 
DIST3 Dummy for DISTANCE [>10km] 
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